Georgia\u27s New Evidence Code - An Overview by Milich, Paul S.
Georgia State University College of Law
Reading Room
Faculty Publications By Year Faculty Publications
1-1-2012
Georgia's New Evidence Code - An Overview
Paul S. Milich
Georgia State University College of Law, pmilich@gsu.edu
Follow this and additional works at: https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/faculty_pub
Part of the Evidence Commons, and the State and Local Government Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Publications at Reading Room. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty
Publications By Year by an authorized administrator of Reading Room. For more information, please contact mbutler@gsu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Paul S. Milich, Georgia's New Evidence Code - An Overview, 28 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 379 (2012).
Georgia State University Law Review
Volume 28
Issue 2 Winter 2012 Article 3
2011
Georgia's New Evidence Code - An Overview
Paul S. Milich
pmillich@gsu.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Publications at Reading Room. It has been accepted for inclusion in Georgia State
University Law Review by an authorized administrator of Reading Room. For more information, please contact dschander@gsu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Milich, Paul S. (2011) "Georgia's New Evidence Code - An Overview," Georgia State University Law Review: Vol. 28: Iss. 2, Article 3.
Available at: http://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol28/iss2/3
  379
GEORGIA’S NEW EVIDENCE CODE – AN 
OVERVIEW 
Paul S. Milich1 
 
I. A BRIEF HISTORY – A LONG AND WINDING ROAD ........................ 380	
II. A STRUCTURAL OVERVIEW OF THE NEW EVIDENCE CODE .......... 384	
III. A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF THIRTY-EIGHT SIGNIFICANT CHANGES 
WROUGHT BY THE NEW RULES ................................................. 387	
(A)	General Rules Applying to Both Civil and Criminal 
Trials .................................................................................. 387	
(B) Rules Relating to Criminal Trials ...................................... 405	
(C)	Rules Relating to Civil Trials ............................................. 414	
IV. 	 UNFINISHED BUSINESS—A FEW ISSUES TO ADDRESS IN THE 
FUTURE ..................................................................................... 419	
V.	 CONCLUSION ............................................................................. 421	
 
On May 3, 2011, Governor Nathan Deal signed into law House 
Bill 24 (HB 24) bringing a new set of evidence rules to the State of 
Georgia.2 The new rules3 will go into effect on January 1, 2013. The 
author of this article was the Reporter for the State Bar Evidence 
Study Committee when new rules were first proposed back in the 
mid-1980s, and again throughout the recent, successful effort to 
reform the rules. Part I of this article will give a brief history of the 
twenty-six-year effort to bring new evidence rules to Georgia. Part II 
will provide a structural overview of the new rules. Part III will then 
describe thirty-eight significant changes that judges and trial lawyers 
will find in the new rules. Finally, Part IV will mention a few 
evidentiary issues that still need attention. 
                                                                                                                 
 1. Professor of Law and Director of the Litigation Program, Georgia State University, College of 
Law. Professor Milich was the Reporter for the State Bar of Georgia Evidence Study Committee that 
proposed the new rules of evidence Law. Professor Milich was the Reporter for the State Bar of Georgia 
Evidence Study Committee that proposed the new rules of evidence. 
 2. 2011 Ga. Laws 52 (to be codified in GA. CODE ANN.). 
 3. For the purposes of this article, “new rules” refers to the rule that will go into effect January 1, 
2013. “Current rules” refers to the rules in effect prior to January 1, 2013. 
1
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I. A BRIEF HISTORY – A LONG AND WINDING ROAD 
Georgia’s current rules of evidence are mostly contained in Title 
24, and most of Title 24 is based on the Code of 1863. In 1858, the 
Georgia Legislature appointed three commissioners, Richard Clark, 
Thomas R. Cobb, and David Irwin, to prepare a code which should 
“as near as practicable, embrace in a condensed form, the laws of 
Georgia,” including the common law and principles of equity then 
recognized by the courts of this state.4 It was a massive task for the 
commissioners, and they were given less than two years to finish it. 
To Judge Irwin fell the task of preparing the Code of Practice, which 
included civil procedure, equity practice, and rules of evidence. The 
work was completed in 1860 and adopted by the legislature with only 
a few minor changes in December of that year. Due to the war, 
publication was delayed until 1863, and thus, the code has been 
referred to ever since as the Code of 1863. 
Although a few rules were added or changed over the years, the 
core of Title 24 remains a product of nineteenth century views on 
trial procedure. To state that these antiquated rules poorly address the 
needs and realities of twenty-first century courtrooms is an 
understatement.5 In 1975, Congress passed the Federal Rules of 
Evidence and this inspired many states to modernize their own rules. 
By 1985, more than thirty states had adopted new rules of evidence 
based on the Federal Rules.6 
In 1985, the Board of Governors of the State Bar of Georgia 
“approved in principle” a proposal to study whether Georgia should 
adopt new rules of evidence based more or less on the Federal Rules 
of Evidence. In 1986, Robert Brinson, the president of the State Bar, 
                                                                                                                 
 4. Richard H. Clark, The History of the First Georgia Code, in REPORT OF THE SEVENTH ANNUAL 
MEETING OF THE GEORGIA BAR ASSOCIATION, 144 (1890). 
 5. See PAUL S. MILICH, GEORGIA RULES OF EVIDENCE § 1.1, at 1–3 (2011–2012 ed. 2011). 
 6. That number has since grown. Georgia is the forty-fourth state to adopt new rules based on the 
Federal Rules of Evidence. 6 JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN’S FEDERAL 
EVIDENCE ch. T, notes (Joseph M. McLaughlin ed., 2d ed. 2011) (listing forty-two of the states). The 
forty-third state, Illinois, adopted new rules in late 2010. See Chris Bonjean, Supreme Court Approves 
Illinois Rules of Evidence, ILL. ST. B. ASS’N (Sept. 27, 2010), http://iln.isba.org/2010/09/27/supreme-
court-approves-illinois-rules-of-evidence. 
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appointed Frank C. Jones chairman of the Evidence Study 
Committee. The committee’s mission was to explore reform of 
Georgia’s old evidence code. The committee undertook an intensive 
review of the differences between the Federal Rules and Georgia’s 
rules. 
In 1987, the General Assembly adopted a joint resolution 
encouraging the study of Georgia’s evidence rules. In 1988, the State 
Bar Evidence Study Committee completed its report to the Bar with a 
full draft of the proposed new rules. The Board of Governors 
approved the new rules and they were introduced, with the State 
Bar’s support, in the 1989 legislative session. 
The proposed new rules were warmly received in the Senate where 
then-Senator Nathan Deal sponsored them. They passed the Senate 
twice, unanimously in 1990, but with a few negative votes in 1991. 
The reception in the House, however, was less warm. Speaker Tom 
Murphy, a trial lawyer, was initially ambivalent about adopting new 
evidence rules. With his characteristic humor, he told this author that 
he was an old dinosaur and that old dinosaurs don’t like to learn new 
tricks. After numerous efforts to convince him that the new rules 
were right for Georgia, the Speaker told Chairman Jones and this 
author, “Georgia will someday have new rules of evidence—just not 
while I am Speaker.” The proposed new rules of evidence were never 
scheduled for a vote in the House Judiciary Committee. 
Taking the Speaker at his word, the State Bar backed off the 
project until 2002 when Speaker Murphy was defeated in his bid for 
reelection. State Bar President Bill Barwick reactivated the Evidence 
Study Committee in 2003 with Ray Persons as chair and Thomas M. 
Byrne as vice chair.7 The committee produced a detailed analysis and 
draft of the proposed new rules in 2005, but progress on the political 
front faltered as the Bar received mixed messages from key 
legislators as to their appetite for undertaking evidence reform. 
In 2008, the State Bar Board of Governors approved the new rules. 
The Chair of the House Judiciary Committee, Wendell Willard, 
welcomed the proposal to advance new rules with one important 
                                                                                                                 
 7. Thomas Byrne eventually succeeded Ray Persons as chair in 2009. 
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proviso: the new rules could not attempt to alter any of the policies 
that were part of the 2005 tort reform efforts. A few parts of the State 
Bar’s proposal that addressed areas affected by the 2005 tort reform 
were withdrawn.8 
In the summer of 2008, a Joint House and Senate Legislative 
Study Committee, chaired by Representative Wendell Willard and 
assisted by members of the State Bar Evidence Study Committee, 
met in fourteen sessions that undertook a line-by-line examination of 
the proposed rules. These sessions were open to the public and 
included input from a wide variety of legal and nonlegal 
organizations. This exhaustive review resulted in House Bill 24 (HB 
24), introduced in the 2009 session. 
It is difficult to get trial lawyers from so many different interest 
groups to agree on a wide-ranging set of evidence rules. One of the 
great advantages of a unified state bar is its ability to bring together 
all of these varied, and at times antagonistic, interests into 
constructive dialog. Personal injury lawyers argue with insurance 
defense lawyers; creditors’ rights advocates fence with debtors’ 
rights attorneys; prosecutors duel with criminal defense lawyers; and 
so on. The evidence proposal exposed generational differences as 
well. Some older trial lawyers, particularly those who practice rarely, 
if at all, in federal courts, naturally were not thrilled at the prospect of 
having to learn new evidence rules. Most younger litigators, on the 
other hand, were taught the Federal Rules in law school and were 
impatient for Georgia to adopt the new rules. Almost all of these 
differences were ironed out in the slow and steady course of 
negotiations, education, and compromise. But in 2009, it was 
apparent that one group was not yet convinced—Georgia 
prosecutors. 
                                                                                                                 
 8. The State Bar’s proposal would have provided some procedural guidance for the handling of 
Daubert motions and would have extended Daubert to criminal, as well as civil cases. See EVIDENCE 
STUDY COMM., STATE BAR OF GA., PROPOSED NEW RULES OF EVIDENCE 76–80 (2005), available at 
http://www.gabar.org/public/pdf/news/proposed_new_evidence_rules.pdf [hereinafter EVIDENCE 
STUDY]. The State Bar proposal also would have amended the “medical apology” statute, GA. CODE 
ANN. § 24-3-37.1(c) (2010), to delete the exclusion of a defendant’s admission of “mistake” or “error.” 
Id.at 49–50. 
4
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Of all the trial lawyers in Georgia, prosecutors have the least 
experience in federal courtrooms. For many prosecutors, particularly 
the more senior ones, the Federal Rules of Evidence represented 
unknown territory. It took the patient efforts of a handful of highly 
respected, forward-looking prosecutors to convince their brothers and 
sisters that there was more to like than to dislike, more to embrace 
than to fear, in the proposed new rules. After further negotiations and 
some amendments to the proposal, the prosecutors withdrew their 
opposition to the new rules in March of 2010. HB 24 passed the 
House by a vote of 150–12. Time ran out in the Senate, however, as 
HB 24 was voted favorably out of the Senate Judiciary Committee 
but died in the Rules Committee. 
As the 2011 session began, it appeared that the stars were finally 
aligned in favor of passing the new Georgia Rules of Evidence. All 
organized opposition was gone. Speaker David Ralston, one of the 
original sponsors of HB 24, was supportive. The new Chair of the 
Senate Judiciary Committee, Bill Hamrick, also was supportive. The 
new Governor, Nathan Deal, had supported the evidence reform 
when he was a senator more than twenty years earlier and reaffirmed 
his support for the latest effort. The Council of Superior Court Judges 
came out in favor of the bill and the State Bar was pushing harder 
than ever to get the bill passed. On February 28, 2011, the House 
voted 162–5 in favor of HB 24. The Senate passed the bill on the last 
day of the session, by a vote of 50–3. 
One of the fears going into the legislative process was that the 
Bar’s proposal would be carved up by amendments and distorted into 
something worse than no new rules at all. Thanks mainly to the 
resolute efforts of House Judiciary Committee Chairman Wendell 
Willard, this did not happen. Although there were compromises 
along the way, the core integrity of the rules—as proposed by the 
State Bar—remained.9 
                                                                                                                 
 9. For more information regarding the history behind the Georgia Evidence Code, see generally 
MILICH, supra note 5, § 1:1. 
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II. A STRUCTURAL OVERVIEW OF THE NEW EVIDENCE CODE 
Current Title 24 is completely replaced by the new rules. Many 
stray evidence provisions from other titles of the Georgia Code have 
been moved into the new Title 24, others have been stricken. So the 
first benefit of the new Code is accessibility—nearly all pertinent 
evidence rules are now contained in the new Title 24. 
The new rules are based on the Federal Rules of Evidence with a 
few changes to address known problems with the current Federal 
Rules10 or to retain particularly desirable Georgia policies. For 
example, the wide-open cross-examination rule is retained,11 as is the 
Gibbons rule that makes all prior inconsistent statements of testifying 
witnesses admissible as substantive evidence.12 
The numbering of the new rules is based on the Federal Rules. The 
new citation will first identify the Georgia Title (24), then the Federal 
Rule of Evidence Article (e.g., 8 for Hearsay), and then the Federal 
Rule number. For example, the new cite to Georgia’s business record 
exception is 24-8-803(6). The new cite to Georgia’s rule on 
impeachment by prior conviction is 24-6-609. 
Section I of HB 24 states: 
It is the intent of the General Assembly in enacting this Act to 
adopt the Federal Rules of Evidence, as interpreted by the 
Supreme Court of the United States and the United States circuit 
courts of appeal as of January 1, 2013, to the extent that such 
interpretation is consistent with the Constitution of Georgia. 
Where conflicts were found to exist among the decisions of the 
various circuit courts of appeal interpreting the federal rules of 
evidence, the General Assembly considered the decisions of the 
11th Circuit Court of Appeals.13 It is the intent of the General 
                                                                                                                 
 10. See discussion infra Part III. 
 11. GA. CODE ANN. § 24-6-611(b) (effective Jan. 1, 2013). 
 12. Gibbons v. State, 286 S.E.2d 717 (Ga. 1982). 
 13. The legislators were mindful that they could not dictate the legal sources that courts must use in 
interpreting and applying the rules of evidence because of the separation of powers issues that such a 
dictation would entail. See Mason v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., 658 S.E.2d 603, 608–10 (Ga. 2008). 
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Assembly to revise, modernize, and reenact the general laws of 
this state relating to evidence while adopting, in large measure, 
the Federal Rules of Evidence. The General Assembly is 
cognizant that there are many issues regarding evidence that are 
not covered by the Federal Rules of Evidence and in those 
situations the former provisions of Title 24 have been retained. 
Unless displaced by the particular provisions of this Act, the 
General Assembly intends that the substantive law of evidence in 
Georgia as it existed on December 31, 2012, be retained.14 
 Among the Georgia rules of evidence that are not 
significantly changed by HB 24 are the following: 
— Evidentiary Privileges (Attorney-Client, Psychotherapist-
Patient, Accountant Client, Both Marital Privileges, News 
Gatherer Privilege, Clergy Privilege, Informant Privilege, Self-
Incrimination Privileges, Medical Records and Confidences 
Protections, Work Product Protections)15 
— Evidentiary Presumptions in Civil and Criminal Cases16 
— Rape Victim Shield Statute17 
— Admission of Accused’s Prior Similar Sex Offenses in Sex  
Crime Cases18 
— Child Competency to Testify in Abuse Cases19 
— Admission of a Child’s Statements Reporting Abuse20 
— Admission of Subsequent Remedial Measures in Product  
Liability Cases21 
— Inadmissibility of Liability Insurance, Collateral Benefits22 
— “Apology Statute” in Medical Malpractice Cases23 
                                                                                                                 
 14. H.R. 24, 151st Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2009), available at 
http://www1.legis.ga.gov/legis/2011_12/fulltext/hb24.htmhttp://www1.legis.ga.gov/legis/2011_12/fullte
xt/hb24.htm. 
 15. See MILICH, supra note 5, Part 6: Evidentiary Privileges. 
 16. See id, pt. 5. 
 17. See id, § 11:6. 
 18. See id, § 11:13. 
 19. See id, § 12:2. 
 20. See id, § 19:31. 
 21. See MILICH, supra note 5, § 18:6. 
 22. See id, § 9:3. 
7
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— Daubert Applies in Civil Cases but Not Criminal Cases24 
— Judicial Notice25 
— Sequestration of Witnesses26 
— Lay Opinion Rules27 
— Rules for Proving Value28 
— Rule of Completeness29 
— Continuing Witness Rule30 
— Wide Open Cross-Examination Rule31 
— Character Rule in Civil Cases32 
— Rules Regarding Demonstrative Evidence33 
— Proving Chain of Custody34 
— Rules Regarding Use of Polygraph Evidence35 
— Rules Regarding Use of Hypnotically Refreshed  
Recollections36 
— Rules Regarding Out-of-Court Identifications of the Accused37 
— Impeachment by Prior Conviction38 
— Distinction Between Offers of Direct and Collateral Benefits in 
Evaluating 
Confessions39 
— “Silent Witness” Rule (Admissibility of Automated Video  
Recordings)40 
— Basic Definition of Hearsay41 
                                                                                                                 
 23. See id, § 18:7. 
 24. See id, § 15:9. 
 25. See id, § 4:2. 
 26. See id, § 13:6. 
 27. See MILICH, supra note 5, § 15:2. 
 28. See id, § 15:11. 
 29. See id, §§ 6:3, 19:8. 
 30. See id, § 19:8. 
 31. See id, § 13:3. 
 32. See id, § 11:9. 
 33. See MILICH, supra note 5, §§ 10:1–4. 
 34. See id, § 7:1. 
 35. See id, § 15:10. 
 36. See id, § 12:6. 
 37. See id, § 17:8. 
 38. See id, § 14:4. 
 39. See MILICH, supra note 5, § 18:8. 
 40. See id, § 7:3. 
 41. See id, § 16:5. 
8
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— Rules Regarding Use of Prior Consistent Statements42 
— Personal Admission Rule43 
— Hearsay Exceptions for Past Recollection Recorded, Statements 
for Medical Diagnosis or Treatment, Medical Narratives, Reputation 
Evidence, Former Testimony, Deposition Testimony, Dying 
Declarations, Necessity Exception (though pre-trial notice 
required).44 
III. A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF THIRTY-EIGHT SIGNIFICANT CHANGES 
WROUGHT BY THE NEW RULES 
The following overview is organized in three sections: General 
Rules Applying to Both Civil and Criminal Trials, Rules Relating 
Only to Criminal Trials, and Rules Relating Only to Civil Trials. 
(A) General Rules Applying to Both Civil and Criminal Trials 
(1) Specific Directions for Making Evidence Rulings—There 
currently are no Georgia statutes that spell out how the trial court is 
to approach evidence issues. While most judges have little problem 
navigating such issues in most cases, the addition of uniform, specific 
directions makes it easier for both lawyers and judges to work 
through preliminary matters. 
New sections 24-1-104(a) and (b) clarify the roles of the judge and 
the jury in preliminary questions of fact. Currently, Georgia juries are 
instructed to determine whether evidence is admissible under a host 
of situations.45 The new rules assign these decisions, with few 
exceptions, solely to the trial judge.46 The judge may consider any 
non-privileged evidence in making these preliminary determinations 
and the court uses a preponderance of the evidence standard in 
                                                                                                                 
 42. See id, § 17:15. 
 43. See id, § 18:3. 
 44. See id, ch. 19. 
 45. See MILICH, supra note 5, § 3.7. 
 46. Preliminary questions concerning the qualification of a person to be a witness, the existence of a 
privilege, or the admissibility of evidence shall be determined by the court, subject to the 
provisions of subsection (b) of this Code section. 
GA. CODE ANN. § 24-1-104(a) (effective Jan. 1, 2013). 
9
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considering whether the preliminary facts have been proven.47 For 
example, before admitting a document under the business record 
exception, the judge must determine whether the record was made in 
the ordinary course of business. The judge may consider any non-
privileged evidence, including hearsay, in making this determination 
and decide whether the proponent has shown, by a preponderance of 
the evidence that the record was made in the ordinary course of 
business. 
When the evidence rule in question is not technical in nature (like 
the business record exception) but goes to the relevance of the 
underlying evidence, the trial judge takes a different approach that 
preserves the ultimate issue for the jury. For example, if the 
substance seized from the defendant is not in fact cocaine, it is 
irrelevant in a trial for possession of that illegal drug. Where the 
relevance of evidence depends upon a preliminary question of fact, 
the judge must admit the evidence if a reasonable jury could find that 
the preliminary fact is proven.48 In making this determination, the 
judge considers only such evidence as the jury will hear at the trial. 
(2) Broader Application of “Plain Error” Review—Currently, 
“plain error” review is limited in Georgia to capital cases and 
allegations that the trial judge improperly commented on the 
evidence in a jury trial,49 though some court of appeals panels have 
applied it more broadly.50 The new rules codify the basic requirement 
that a party must object to a trial court ruling in order to preserve 
                                                                                                                 
 47. In making its determination, the court shall not be bound by the rules of evidence except those 
with respect to privileges. Preliminary questions shall be resolved by a preponderance of the 
evidence standard. 
Id. This last sentence of subsection (a) was added to the language of the Federal Rule in order to clarify 
what federal case law has confirmed: the court should use a preponderance of the evidence standard in 
deciding preliminary questions. See, e.g., Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 175–76 (1987). 
 48. When the relevancy of evidence depends upon the fulfillment of a condition of fact, the court 
shall admit it upon, or subject to, the introduction of evidence sufficient to support a finding of 
the fulfillment of the condition. 
GA. CODE ANN. § 24-1-104(b) (effective Jan. 1, 2013). This is consistent with current Georgia law 
which views most authentication issues as jury issues and the judge should admit the evidence for jury 
consideration if it is legally sufficient to support a jury finding that it is what the proponent claims it to 
be. See Jones v. State, 401 S.E.2d 322, 323 (Ga. Ct. App. 1991). 
 49. Paul v. State, 537 S.E.2d 58, 61 (Ga. 2000). 
 50. See, e.g., In re M.F., 623 S.E.2d 235, 236 (2005). But see Delgado v. State, 651 S.E.2d 201, 206 
(Ga. Ct. App. 2007) (deferring to Supreme Court’s limitation on plain error review). 
10
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error,51 but clarifies that this does not prevent the appellate courts 
from considering plain error in all instances.52 The standard for what 
constitutes plain error was not changed. Georgia courts have defined 
it as error “so clearly erroneous as to result in a likelihood of a grave 
miscarriage of justice or which seriously affects the fairness, integrity 
or public reputation of a judicial proceeding.”53 
(3) Clarifies the “Balancing Test”—Although Georgia courts 
have recognized the power of a trial judge to exclude relevant 
evidence when its probative value is outweighed by unfair prejudicial 
effects, our courts have described the balancing test inconsistently. 
Some cases state that the court may exclude the evidence only if the 
unfair prejudicial effects “substantially outweigh” the probative 
value, while many other cases do not include the word 
“substantially” and permit exclusion if the prejudice simply 
outweighs the probative value of the evidence.54 The new rules adopt 
the language of Federal Rule 403 that the prejudicial effects must 
substantially outweigh the probative value.55 
(4) Definition of Hearsay—Georgia’s current definition of 
hearsay56 and the federal definition57 (adopted by the new rules) 
                                                                                                                 
 51. Error shall not be predicated upon a ruling which admits or excludes evidence unless a 
substantial right of the party is affected and: 
 (1) In case the ruling is one admitting evidence, a timely objection or motion to strike 
appears of record, stating the specific ground of objection, if the specific ground was not 
apparent from the context; or 
 (2) In case the ruling is one excluding evidence, the substance of the evidence was made 
known to the court by an offer of proof or was apparent from the context within which questions 
were asked. 
GA. CODE ANN. § 24-1-103(a) (effective Jan. 1, 2013). 
 52. Nothing in this Code section shall preclude a court from taking notice of plain errors affecting 
substantial rights although such errors were not brought to the attention of the court. 
Id. § 24-1-103(d). 
 53. Thorne v. State, 542 S.E.2d 157, 159 (Ga. Ct. App. 2000) (citation omitted); see United States v. 
Rodriguez, 398 F.3d 1291, 1298–99 (11th Cir. 2005). 
 54. See MILICH, supra note 5, § 6.4, at 110 n.1 (citing cases). 
 55. Relevant evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the 
danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury or by considerations of 
undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence. 
GA. CODE ANN. § 24-4-403 (effective Jan. 1, 2013). 
 56. Hearsay evidence is that which does not derive its value solely from the credit of the witness but 
rests mainly on the veracity and competency of other persons. 
GA. CODE ANN. § 24-3-1 (2010). 
 57. Compare FED. R. EVID. 801(c) (“‘Hearsay’ is a statement, other than one made by the declarant 
11
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serve much the same function. The main difference is that Georgia’s 
current definition does not include the out-of-court statements of a 
testifying witness.58 This makes more sense than the federal 
approach. The primary problem with hearsay is the inability to cross-
examine the hearsay declarant, to raise questions that could help the 
trier of fact determine if the declarant was lying or mistaken when the 
statement was made.59 If the hearsay declarant is on the stand and 
available for cross-examination, these problems are not present and 
the witness’s prior out-of-court statements should be admissible if 
they are relevant and not merely cumulative of the witness’s in-court 
testimony. Such statements are relevant when they are prior 
inconsistent statements of the witness or prior consistent statements 
that rebut an attack on the witness’s credibility.60 
Georgia’s new rules retain Georgia’s current approach to a 
testifying witness’s prior out-of-court statements. Such statements are 
not hearsay.61 Normally, such statements are inadmissible, not 
because they are hearsay, but because they are cumulative and 
improper bolstering of the witness’s in-court testimony.62 If the 
                                                                                                                 
while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.”), 
with GA. CODE ANN. § 24-8-801(c) (effective Jan. 1, 2013) (“‘Hearsay’ means a statement, other than 
one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth 
of the matter asserted.”). 
 58. See, e.g., Carroll v. State, 408 S.E.2d 412, 413 (Ga. 1991) (“In Cuzzort, we held that the 
concerns of the rule against hearsay are satisfied where the witness whose veracity is at issue is present 
at trial, under oath, and subject to cross-examination.”). In Bowers v. State, a defendant claimed that the 
witness’s testimony about her own prior out-of-court statements was hearsay and the court disagreed, 
stating: “Hearsay evidence is that which does not derive its value solely from the credit of the witness 
but rests mainly on the veracity and competency of other persons. Here, the witness was the 
declarant. . . . Her statements were not dependent upon the competency and veracity of other persons.”). 
Bowers v. State, 526 S.E.2d 163, 166 (Ga. Ct. App. 1999) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 59. See MILICH, supra note 5, § 16.4. 
 60. See MILICH, supra note 5, §§ 16.5, 17.14, 17.16. 
 61. An out-of-court statement shall not be hearsay if the declarant testifies at the trial or hearing, is 
subject to cross-examination concerning the statement, and the statement is admissible as a prior 
inconsistent statement or a prior consistent statement under Code Section 24-6-613 or is 
otherwise admissible under this chapter. 
GA. CODE ANN. § 24-8-801(d)(1)(A) (effective Jan. 1, 2013). 
 62. See Parker v. State, 290 S.E.2d 518, 521 (Ga. Ct. App. 1982). (“In Georgia, as well as most other 
jurisdictions, the general rule is that a witness’ testimony cannot be fortified or corroborated by his own 
prior consistent statements. . . . ‘It can scarcely be satisfactory to any mind to say that, if a witness 
testifies to a statement today under oath, it strengthens the statement to prove that he said the same thing 
yesterday when not under oath. . . [.] The idea that the mere repetition of a story gives it any force or 
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witness’s prior out-of-court statements are admissible as prior 
inconsistent statements to impeach him or as prior consistent 
statements to rehabilitate his credibility after attack, then they are 
admissible on that basis without regard to the hearsay rule. 
(5) Self-Serving Statement Rule Retired—Under current Georgia 
law, an out-of-court statement is inadmissible if deemed “self-
serving,” that is, if the statement is “of benefit to or in the interest of 
the one who made it . . . and does not include testimony which he 
gives as a witness.”63 This is a rather antiquated rule that originated 
at a time when parties were deemed incompetent to testify. This rule 
prevented them from circumventing that incompetency by having 
witnesses offer the parties’ out-of-court, self-serving statements.64 
Since it really is nothing more than an application of the hearsay rule, 
it is no longer needed.65 
(6) Hearsay No Longer “Illegal” Evidence—Under current 
Georgia law, hearsay is “illegal” evidence without probative value, 
and even if admitted without objection, cannot sustain a finding or 
verdict.66 Georgia is the only jurisdiction in the United States that 
still deems hearsay illegal evidence.67 The rule is little more than a 
trap for the unwary and an incentive to sandbag.68 The new rules 
specifically state: “Hearsay shall not be admissible except as 
provided by this article; provided, however, that if a party does not 
properly object to hearsay, the objection shall be deemed waived, and 
the hearsay evidence shall be legal evidence and admissible.”69 
                                                                                                                 
proves its truth is contrary to common observation and experience that a falsehood may be repeated as 
often as the truth.’” (quoting 4 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 1124, 
at 258 (James H. Chadbourn ed., 1976))); see also Boyt v. State, 649 S.E.2d 589, 592 (Ga. Ct. App. 
2007). 
 63. Ga. Ports Auth. v. Mitsubishi Int’l Corp., 274 S.E.2d 699, 702 (Ga. Ct. App. 1980). 
 64. See 1 GEORGE E. DIX ET AL., MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 270 (Kenneth S. Broun ed., 6th ed. 
2006) [hereinafter MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE]. 
 65. Chrysler Motor Corp. v. Davis, 173 S.E.2d 691, 693 (Ga. 1982). 
 66. See Woodruff v. Woodruff, 531 S.E.2d 714, 716 (Ga. 2000); Cabrera v. State, 694 S.E.2d 720, 
723–24 (Ga. Ct. App. 2010). 
 67. See MILICH, supra note 5, § 16.7. 
 68. See, e.g., Patterson v. State, 650 S.E.2d 770, 774 (Ga. Ct. App. 2007); Anton Int’l Corp. v. 
Williams-Russell & Johnson, Inc., 377 S.E.2d 688, 689 (Ga. Ct. App. 1989); see also Roebuck v. State, 
586 S.E.2d 651, 659, 660 (Ga. 2003) (Fletcher, C.J., concurring) (“[W]e should overrule our prior cases 
holding that hearsay has no probative value even when admitted without objection.”). 
 69. GA. CODE ANN. § 24-8-802 (effective Jan. 1, 2013). 
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(7) The Term “Original Evidence” Retired—Georgia’s 
nineteenth century evidence statutes use the term “original evidence” 
to refer to out-of-court statements that are offered for a nonhearsay 
purpose.70 Although current Georgia law is logically consistent with 
the federal definition of hearsay and the distinction between the 
hearsay and nonhearsay use of out-of-court statements, Georgia has 
struggled with some of the arcane terminology in this area.71 
Adopting the federal definition of hearsay introduces a more modern 
and descriptive vocabulary for distinguishing hearsay from 
nonhearsay. Such widely used and familiar terms as “effect on 
hearer” and “verbal act” replace “original evidence.” In the end, the 
goal is the same under the old and new rules: To distinguish the use 
of statements that depend upon the credibility of the out-of-court 
declarant (hearsay) from statements that are relevant for the mere fact 
that they were said (nonhearsay). 
(8) Res Gestae Retired—The much-maligned doctrine of “res 
gestae” is finally put to rest.72 As Professor Morgan wrote nearly a 
hundred years ago: “The marvelous capacity of a Latin phrase to 
serve as a substitute for reasoning, and the confusion of thought 
inevitably accompanying the use of inaccurate terminology, are no 
where better illustrated than in the decisions dealing with the 
admissibility of evidence as ‘res gestae.’”73 
As a hearsay exception, the problem with res gestae is its 
vagueness, its lack of direction. Too often, the term is invoked more 
as a “shibboleth” than as a product of analysis or reasoning.74 As one 
                                                                                                                 
 70. When, in a legal investigation, information, conversations, letters and replies, and similar 
evidence are facts to explain conduct and ascertain motives, they shall be admitted in evidence 
not as hearsay but as original evidence. 
GA. CODE ANN. § 24-3-2 (2010). 
 71. See, e.g., White Missionary Baptist Church v. Trustees of First Baptist Church of White, 492 
S.E.2d 661, 669 (Ga, 1997); Teague v. State, 314 S.E.2d 910, 910–12 (Ga. 1984); see also MILICH, 
supra note 5, §§ 17.1–.6. 
 72. Declarations accompanying an act, or so nearly connected therewith in time as to be free from all 
suspicion of device or afterthought, shall be admissible in evidence as part of the res gestae. 
GA. CODE ANN. § 24-3-3 (2010). 
 73. Edmund M. Morgan, A Suggested Classification of Utterances Admissible as Res Gestae, 31 
YALE L.J. 229, 229 (1922). 
 74. See 6 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 1745, at 191–92 (James 
H. Chadbourn ed., 1976) (“There has been such a confounding of ideas, and such a profuse and 
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prominent Georgia trial lawyer explained to me years ago: “Res 
gestae is very simple. If the judge likes you, it gets in. If the judge 
doesn’t like you, it doesn’t get in.” 
The new rules replace res gestae with three descriptive hearsay 
exceptions that have worked well in federal and state courts for the 
past thirty-plus years: 803(1), (2), and (3). 
Subsection (1) admits statements that are contemporaneous, or 
nearly so, with the declarant’s perception of the events or conditions 
described.75 Subsection (2), the excited utterance exception, admits 
statements “relating to a startling event or condition made while the 
declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by the event or 
condition.”76 
Subsection (3) admits statements of the declarant’s then-existing 
mental, emotional, or physical condition when relevant to some issue 
in the case.77 Statements of a declarant’s belief or memory are not 
admissible if offered to prove the truth of the matter believed or 
remembered. Thus, the out-of-court statement, “I believe Joe killed 
Sally,” is just as inadmissible as the statement, “Joe killed Sally,” 
when offered to prove the truth of the matter believed or asserted.78 
Subsection (3) also admits a declarant’s statement of intent or plan 
regarding his future conduct as circumstantial evidence that the 
declarant carried out that intent. Thus, the statement, “I plan to go to 
Savannah tonight,” is admissible. But if the statement is, “I plan to go 
to Savannah tonight with Sally,” the statement is both a statement of 
                                                                                                                 
indiscriminate use of the shibboleth res gestae, that it is difficult to disentangle the real basis of the 
principle involved.”). 
 75. A statement describing or explaining an event or condition made while the declarant was 
perceiving the event or condition or immediately thereafter. 
GA. CODE ANN. § 24-8-803(1) (effective Jan. 1, 2013); e.g., Miller v. Crown Amusements, Inc., 821 F. 
Supp. 703 (S.D. Ga. 1993). 
 76. GA. CODE ANN. § 24-8-803(2) (effective Jan. 1, 2013); e.g., United States v. Belfast, 611 F.3d 
783, 817 (11th Cir. 2010). 
 77. A statement of the declarant’s then existing state of mind, emotion, sensation, or physical 
condition, such as intent, plan, motive, design, mental feeling, pain, and bodily health, but not 
including a statement of memory or belief to prove the fact remembered or believed unless such 
statements relate to the execution, revocation, identification, or terms of the declarant’s will and 
not including a statement of belief as to the intent of another person. 
GA. CODE ANN. § 24-8-803(3) (effective Jan. 1, 2013); e.g., United States v. Samaniego, 345 F.3d 1280, 
1282 (11th Cir. 2003). 
 78. § 24-8-803(3); e.g., Samaniego, 345 F.3d at 1282. 
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the declarant’s then-existing intent and of the declarant’s belief as to 
the intent of another person. This is the so-called Hillmon problem 
based on the 1892 United States Supreme Court case, Mutual Life 
Insurance Co. v. Hillmon, where the declarant’s statement that he 
intended to travel to Colorado with Hillmon was admitted.79 The 
result in Hillmon has been criticized,80 and Georgia courts have not 
allowed a declarant’s statement of belief as to the intent of another.81 
The new rules retain current Georgia policy and expressly limit 
statements of intent to the declarant’s own intent and not that of third 
persons.82 
(9) Business Record Exception Allows Opinions—Under 
Georgia’s current business record exception, “conclusions, opinions, 
estimates, and impressions of third parties not before the court” are 
inadmissible.83 The new rules reject these limitations,84 though lay or 
expert opinions in the record still require qualification under the 
opinion rules.85 
(10) Business Record Exception Foundation by Affidavit—Current 
Georgia law requires a “qualified witness” to appear at trial and lay 
                                                                                                                 
 79. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Hillmon, 145 U.S. 285, 299–300 (1892). 
 80. See, e.g., Paul S. Milich, Hearsay Antinomies: The Case for Abolishing the Rule and Starting 
Over, 71 OR. L. REV. 723 (1992). 
 81. See, e.g., Mallory v. State, 409 S.E.2d 839, 841 (Ga. 1991) (finding declarant’s statement that 
she intended to meet the defendant later for coffee was inadmissible to prove that the two probably met 
for coffee); see also H.R. REP. NO. 93-650, at 13–14 (1st Sess. 1973) (“[T]he Committee intends that the 
Rule be construed to limit the doctrine of Mutual Life Ins Co. v. Hillmon, so as to render statements of 
intent by a declarant admissible only to prove his future conduct, not the future conduct of another 
person.”(citation omitted)). 
 82. GA. CODE ANN. § 24-8-803(3) (does not include “a statement of belief as to the intent of another 
person”). 
 83. Turner v. State, 541 S.E.2d 641, 645 n.2 (Ga. 2001) (citing Duncan v. State, 515 S.E.2d 388 (Ga. 
1999)). 
 84. Records of regularly conducted activity. Unless the source of information or the method or 
circumstances of preparation indicate lack of trustworthiness and subject to the provisions of 
Chapter 7 of this title, a memorandum, report, record, or data compilation, in any form, of acts, 
events, conditions, opinions, or diagnoses, if (A) made at or near the time of the described acts, 
events, conditions, opinions, or diagnoses; (B) made by, or from information transmitted by, a 
person with personal knowledge and a business duty to report; (C) kept in the course of a 
regularly conducted business activity; and (D) it was the regular practice of that business activity 
to make the memorandum, report, record, or data compilation . . . . 
GA. CODE ANN. § 24-8-803(6) (effective Jan. 1, 2013). 
 85. Id.; see id. § 24-7-701 (lay opinions); id. § 24-7-702 (expert opinions). 
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the requisite foundation for a business record.86 The new rules offer 
an additional option.87 A party can acquire a certification from the 
custodian or other person qualified to lay foundation for the record 
under the business record exception. The party must give all 
opposing parties advanced written notice of its intent to use the 
certification in lieu of live testimony and make the record available 
for inspection prior to trial.88 
This certification procedure is available in criminal cases for 
domestic records though nothing in the new rules changes any 
Confrontation Clause issues that might affect, in certain cases, the 
prosecution’s offer of records without the testimony of a live 
witness.89 
(11) Business Record Exception—”Integrated Records Rule”—
Georgia courts have struggled under the current business record 
statute with the problem of one business laying foundation for 
records received from a different business. The cases are inconsistent 
and have permitted, in some cases, a witness to “lay foundation” for a 
business record without any evidence that the witness has a clue as to 
how the record was produced.90 
                                                                                                                 
 86. See MILICH, supra note 5, § 19:15. 
 87. See GA. CODE ANN. § 24-8-803(6). 
 88. Extrinsic evidence of authenticity as a condition precedent to admissibility shall not be required 
with respect to the following: . . . 
(11) The original or a duplicate of a domestic record of regularly conducted activity that would 
be admissible under paragraph (6) of Code Section 24-8-803 if accompanied by a written 
declaration of its custodian or other qualified person certifying that the record: 
 (A) Was made at or near the time of the occurrence of the matters set forth by, or from 
information transmitted by, a person with knowledge of such matters; 
   (B) Was kept in the course of the regularly conducted activity; and 
   (C) Was made by the regularly conducted activity as a regular practice. 
A party intending to offer a record into evidence under this paragraph shall provide written 
notice of such intention to all adverse parties and shall make the record and declaration available 
for inspection sufficiently in advance of their offer into evidence to provide an adverse party 
with a fair opportunity to challenge such record and declaration. 
Id. § 24-9-902. New Code section 24-9-902(12) is to the same effect regarding foreign records though it 
applies only in civil cases. 
 89. See generally Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527 (2009) (offering of records 
without live testimony). 
 90. See, e.g., Walter R. Thomas Assoc., Inc. v. Media Dynamite, Inc., 643 S.E.2d 883, 886 (Ga. 
2007); see also MILICH, supra note 5, § 19.15. 
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The new business record exception is based on the Federal Rule 
and takes advantage of the “integrated records rule” as developed by 
federal courts to address this problem. The basic requirements for the 
integrated records rule are (1) a business relationship between the 
business that initially made the record and the one who received it, 
(2) the recipient business routinely relies upon the accuracy of the 
record and integrates it into its own files, (3) the recipient business 
has a witness who is sufficiently familiar with how the originating 
business routinely prepared the record to establish that the record was 
made and kept in the ordinary course of business at or near the time 
of the events described in the record, and (4) circumstances support 
the trustworthiness of the record.91 
(12) Public Records Hearsay Exception—Under current Georgia 
law, public records offered to prove the truth of the matters asserted 
in the records92 are often admitted under the general business record 
exception or one of the dozens of specific Georgia statutes relating to 
the admissibility of records of a particular agency or office. 93 The 
new rules provide a set of generic provisions governing the 
admission of public records,94 though these are still subject to 
specific statutes. Thus, for example, accident reports filed with the 
Department of Motor Vehicle Safety would continue to be 
inadmissible under current Georgia Code Section 40-9-41. 
There are three generic categories of public records under the new 
rules.95 The first, activities of the office or agency itself, is admissible 
without restriction in civil and criminal cases. 
                                                                                                                 
 91. See Air Land Forwarders, Inc. v. United States, 172 F.3d 1338, 1342–45 (Fed. Cir. 1999); see 
also Kolmes v. World Fibers Corp., 107 F.3d 1534, 1542–43 (Fed. Cir. 1997); United States v. Bueno-
Sierra, 99 F.3d 375, 379 (11th Cir. 1996); NLRB v. First Termite Control Co., 646 F.2d 424, 427 (9th 
Cir. 1981). 
 92. The very existence of certain documents, such as deeds or licenses, has a legal effect apart from 
any hearsay use. A deed, for example, is not “true or false,” but “valid or invalid.” When a public record 
is offered only for its legal effect, it is not hearsay and requires no exception. See MILICH, supra note 5, 
§ 19.15, at 693 n.19. 
 93. Id. § 19.19. 
 94. GA. CODE ANN. § 24-8-803(8) (effective Jan. 1, 2013). 
 95. Public records and reports. Except as otherwise provided by law, public records, reports, 
statements, or data compilations, in any form, of public offices, setting forth: 
   (A) The activities of the public office; 
 (B) Matters observed pursuant to duty imposed by law as to which matters there was a duty 
18
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The second category, matters observed pursuant to duty 
(subsection (B)), is unavailable to the prosecution in a criminal case 
when the author or sources of the information are law enforcement 
acting in an investigative capacity. When a law enforcement official 
prepares a report as a mundane, ministerial function, and not in the 
course of an investigation, the report is admissible in a criminal case. 
Thus, for example, an intoxilyzer inspection certification is 
admissible without the testimony of the inspector under this 
exception,96 and this is consistent with current law.97 
The third category, investigative reports (subsection (C)), is 
completely unavailable to the prosecution in a criminal case. For 
example, a drug analysis report is inadmissible in a criminal trial 
without the testimony of someone from the drug lab.98 Of course, if 
the author of or sources in the report testify at trial, the report may be 
used, with proper foundation, to refresh recollection99 or as past 
recollections recorded.100 
“Factual findings,” in subsection (C), is broader than “matters 
observed,” in subsection (B), in that it implies that the preparer of the 
report relies on sources of information other than his own personal 
knowledge. In this respect, subsection (C) may admit what otherwise 
might constitute multiple hearsay. It also may include opinions.101 
However, factual findings should not extend to include legal 
conclusions of the preparer.102 As with business records,103 if the 
                                                                                                                 
to report, excluding, however, against the accused in criminal proceedings, matters observed by 
police officers and other law enforcement personnel in connection with an investigation; or 
 (C) In civil proceedings and against the state in criminal proceedings, factual findings 
resulting from an investigation made pursuant to authority granted by law, unless the sources of 
information or other circumstances indicate lack of trustworthiness. 
Id. 
 96. E.g., Commonwealth v. Roberts, 122 S.W.3d 524, 528–29 (Ky. 2003); State v. Smith, 675 P.2d 
510, 512 (Or. Ct. App. 1984); State v. Dilliner, 569 S.E.2d 211, 215 (W. Va. 2002). 
 97. See Rackoff v. State, 637 S.E.2d 706, 709 (Ga. 2006); Ritter v. State, 703 S.E.2d 8, 10 (Ga. Ct. 
App. 2010). 
 98. See Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2540 (2009); Herrera v. State, 702 S.E.2d 
854, 857 (Ga. 2010). 
 99. GA. CODE ANN. § 24-6-612 (effective Jan. 1, 2013). 
 100. Id. § 24-8-803(5). 
 101. See Rainey v. Beech Aircraft, 488 U.S. 153, 170 (1988). 
 102. E.g., Hines v. Brandon Steel Decks, Inc., 886 F.2d 299, 303 (11th Cir. 1989). 
 103. GA. CODE ANN. § 24-8-803(6) (effective Jan. 1, 2013). 
19
Milich: Georgia's New Evidence Code - An Overview
Published by Reading Room, 2011
398 GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 28:2 
 
sources of information or other circumstances indicate a lack of 
trustworthiness of an investigative report offered under subsection 
(C), the court may exclude it. 
(13) Necessity Exception Adds a Notice Requirement—The current 
Georgia necessity exception is the same as the new one, based on 
Federal Rule 807, with one difference. Current Georgia law does not 
require pretrial notice of intent to invoke the exception.104 Under the 
new rule, a statement may not be admitted: 
[U]nless the proponent of it makes known to the adverse party, 
sufficiently in advance of the trial or hearing to provide the 
adverse party with a fair opportunity to prepare to meet it, the 
proponent’s intention to offer the statement and the particulars of 
it, including the name and address of the declarant.105 
(14)  Refreshing Recollection—Under both current law and the new 
rules, counsel can use anything to refresh the recollection of a 
witness.106 But Georgia cases are inconsistent on when the opposing 
lawyer can demand to see any writing used to refresh a witness’s 
recollection, either before or during the witness’s examination. Some 
Georgia cases state that the opponent has this right only in criminal, 
not civil, cases, though why the two should be treated differently is 
never explained.107 Other Georgia cases extend this right to civil, as 
well as criminal, cases.108 
The new rules end any confusion. In both civil and criminal cases, 
opposing counsel has the right to see any writing used to refresh a 
witness on the stand, to question the witness regarding the writing, 
and to introduce any portions of the writing that “relate to the 
testimony of the witness.”109 As for writings shown to a witness to 
                                                                                                                 
 104. See MILICH, supra note 5, §19:32. 
 105. GA. CODE ANN. § 24-8-807 (effective Jan. 1, 2013). 
 106. E.g., United States v. Darden, 70 F.3d 1507, 1540 (8th Cir. 1995); Miller v. State, 561 S.E.2d 
810, 814 (Ga. 2002); Green v. State, 249 S.E.2d 1, 5 (Ga. 1978). 
 107. See, e.g., Schofield v. Meders, 632 S.E.2d 369, 369 (Ga. 2006). 
 108. E.g., Lester v. S. J. Alexander, Inc., 193 S.E.2d 860, 862 (Ga. Ct. App. 1972); State Highway 
Dep’t v. Godfrey, 164 S.E.2d 340, 341 (Ga. Ct. App. 1968). 
 109. GA. CODE ANN § 24-6-612(a) (effective Jan. 1, 2013). 
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refresh his recollection before testifying, “if the court in its discretion 
determines it is necessary in the interests of justice,” the opposing 
party may see the writings, question the witness regarding them, and 
introduce any portions of the writing that “relate to the testimony of 
the witness.”110 
The new Georgia rule also has an additional sentence, not in the 
Federal Rule, that codifies current Georgia practice regarding 
showing a witness, prior to her testifying, materials that might be 
protected under the attorney-client privilege or work product rule. “If 
the writing used is protected by the attorney-client privilege or as 
attorney work product under Code Section 9-11-26, use of the 
writing to refresh recollection prior to the trial shall not constitute a 
waiver of that privilege or protection.”111 
(15) Authentication Made Easier—The new rules make the 
authentication of evidence (documents, things, voices, photos, etc.) 
easier in three ways. First, the new rules make explicit the lenient 
standard for admissibility: “[E]vidence sufficient to support a finding 
that the matter in question is what its proponent claims.”112 This 
standard underscores that, ultimately, it is a question for the trier of 
fact whether evidence is authentic, and thus, the judge should admit 
the evidence if a reasonable fact finder could find it authentic.113 
Second, the new rules collect and park in one place all the rules for 
authenticating every type of evidence.114 This increased accessibility 
will make the resolution of authentication issues quicker and easier. 
Finally, the new rules relax some of the requirements for 
authenticating certain kinds of evidence. For example, authenticating 
phone calls is easier under the new rules.115 Notarized documents are 
                                                                                                                 
 110. Id. § 24-6-612(b). Current Georgia law, at least in criminal cases, allows opposing counsel to 
examine writings used to refresh a witness’s testimony after the trial began. Baxter v. State, 331 S.E.2d 
561, 571 (Ga. 1985). 
 111. GA. CODE ANN. § 24-6-612(b) (effective Jan. 1, 2013) (citation omitted); see, e.g., McKinnon v. 
Smock, 445 S.E.2d 526, 528 (Ga. 1994) (upholding work product protection when witness used attorney 
materials to prepare testimony before trial). 
 112. GA. CODE ANN. § 24-9-901(a) (effective Jan. 1, 2013). 
 113. Id. § 24-10-1008. 
 114. See id. §§ 24-9-901 to -924. 
 115. Compare id. § 24-9-901(b)(6), with Tidwell Co. v. Robley Hats, Inc., 186 S.E.2d 489, 494–95 
(Ga. Ct. App. 1971). 
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self-authenticating under the new rules.116 The rules regarding proof 
of chain of custody in criminal cases are unchanged.117 
(16)  Best Evidence Rule Applies to All Recordings, Not Just 
“Writings”—Although the new rules do not use the term “best 
evidence,” the substance of the rule remains—a party may not testify 
to the contents of a writing or other recording without producing it.118 
Georgia’s current best evidence rule is from the Code of 1863 and 
applies only to “writings,” not photos, video, or any other 
recordings.119 The new rules apply to any form of recorded facts or 
data.120 
(17)  Best Evidence Rule—Copies Presumptively Acceptable—
Under Georgia’s current best evidence rule, a party must either 
produce the original of a writing or account for its nonproduction 
before the party may use a copy.121 The new rules provide: 
A duplicate shall be admissible to the same extent as an original 
unless: 
(1) A genuine question is raised as to the authenticity of the 
original; or 
(2) A circumstance exists where it would be unfair to admit 
the duplicate in lieu of the original.122 
(18) The Ultimate Issue Rule Abolished . . . Nominally—Current 
Georgia law embraces a limited form of the “ultimate issue rule” by 
prohibiting lay or expert opinion that mixes law and fact.123 For 
example, there is no problem under current Georgia law (or Federal 
Rule 704) if an expert testifies in a legal malpractice case that the 
defendant failed to use the degree of care and skill expected of an 
                                                                                                                 
 116. GA. CODE ANN. § 24-9-902(8) (effective Jan. 1, 2013). 
 117. Compare Hurst v. State, 676 S.E.2d 165, 167 (Ga. 2009), and Johnson v. State, 519 S.E.2d 221, 
229–30 (Ga. 1999), with United States v. Jackson, 345 F.3d 59, 65 (2d Cir. 2003). 
 118. GA. CODE ANN. § 24-10-1002 (effective Jan. 1, 2013); see MILICH, supra note 5, § 8.2. 
 119. See, e.g., Perkins v. State, 392 S.E.2d 872, 876 (Ga. Ct. App. 1990). 
 120. GA. CODE ANN. § 24-10-1001 (effective Jan. 1, 2013). 
 121. See MILICH, supra note 5, § 8.3. 
 122. GA. CODE ANN. § 24-10-1003 (effective Jan. 1, 2013). 
 123. Id. § 24-9-65; see Metro Life Ins. Co. v. Saul, 5 S.E.2d 214, 214 (Ga. 1939). 
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ordinary lawyer practicing in Georgia.124 The standard of care of 
attorneys is beyond the ken of ordinary jurors, and thus, they require 
expert assistance in drawing opinions and inferences from the 
evidence.125 However, current Georgia law does not allow a witness 
to testify in legal terms or state legal conclusions.126 
The ultimate issue rule has been a source of more than its fair 
share of debate and confusion.127 The new rules adopt Federal Rule 
704, which states that evidence “is not objectionable because it 
embraces an ultimate issue to be decided by the trier of fact.”128 
Federal Rule 704 was amended in 1984 to revive the prohibition 
against a witness testifying to an ultimate issue of whether an 
accused in a criminal case did or did not have a relevant mental 
state.129 
Although abolished by name, federal courts still will not allow 
witnesses to present opinions in legal terms or to invade the province 
of the jury by drawing inferences that the jurors are fully capable of 
drawing on their own.130 Rather than stating that such opinions 
violate the ultimate issue rule, courts exclude them on the grounds 
that they are not helpful or will not assist the trier of fact.131 
(19) Hypothetical Questions Never Required—The hypothetical 
question was required at common law so that the trier of fact could 
more clearly understand the factual bases of the expert’s opinion.132 
                                                                                                                 
 124. See, e.g., Bilt Rite of Augusta, Inc. v. Gardiner, 472 S.E. 2d 709, 710 (Ga. Ct. App. 1996). 
 125. See, e.g., id. 
 126. See, e.g., Allen v. Columbus Bank & Trust Co., 534 S.E.2d 917, 924 (Ga. Ct. App. 2000). 
 127. See MILICH, supra note 5, § 15.1. 
 128. FED. R. EVID. 704. 
 129. David P. Leonard, The Federal Rules of Evidence and the Political Process, 22 FORDHAM URB. 
L.J. 305, 317-18 (1994). This was called the “Hinkley Amendment” because it was motivated by 
reaction to experts testifying in the trial of John Hinkley for his attempted assassination of President 
Ronald Reagan. 
 130. See, e.g., Montgomery v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 898 F.2d 1537, 1541 (11th Cir. 1990) (holding 
an expert’s testimony that defendant “had a duty to hire tax counsel” should have been excluded); 
Shahid v. City of Detroit, 889 F.2d 1543, 1547–48 (6th Cir. 1989) (holding an expert’s testimony that 
police officer was negligent was inadmissible). 
 131. These requirements that opinion testimony be helpful or assist the trier of fact are contained in 
Federal Rules 701(b) (lay opinions) and 702 (expert opinions). See FED. R. EVID. 701–02; see also GA. 
CODE ANN. §§ 24-7-701 to -702 (effective Jan. 1, 2013). 
 132. MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 64, §16; see Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Saul, 5 S.E.2d 214, 
214–15 (Ga. 1939). 
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But experience with the requirement in Georgia and elsewhere 
showed it was often an unnecessary impediment to the clear 
presentation of expert testimony and an unneeded generator of 
courtroom quibbling and appeals.133 
The new Georgia rules adopt Federal Rule 705, eliminating any 
requirement that an expert be questioned by way of hypothetical 
questions.134 This reflects the modern view that trial counsels’ 
competing motives to present a clear, persuasive direct examination 
of an expert and a thorough and sifting cross-examination, are 
sufficient to ensure that the trier of fact understands the bases and any 
limitations of an expert’s testimony. 
Counsel still may use hypothetical questions on direct or cross if 
counsel desires.135 If a hypothetical question is used, the traditional 
rules apply—it must be based upon evidence that has or will be 
admitted at trial plus reasonable inferences from that evidence.136 
(20) Character Witnesses Used for Impeachment: Reputation and 
Opinion Evidence—Current Georgia law limits a character witness 
who testifies regarding the credibility of another witness to stating 
the reputation of the subject and does not allow opinion testimony. 
Georgia courts have criticized this limitation.137 The new rules 
expressly allow a qualified witness to testify not only to a person’s 
reputation for truthfulness but also to express an opinion concerning 
that person’s character for truthfulness.138 
                                                                                                                 
 133. MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 64, §16; see, e.g., Hyles v. Cockrill, 312 S.E.2d 124, 130 
(Ga. Ct. App. 1983). 
 134. An expert may testify in terms of opinion or inference and give reasons therefore without first 
testifying to the underlying facts or data, unless the court requires otherwise. An expert may in 
any event be required to disclose the underlying facts or data on cross-examination. 
GA. CODE ANN. § 24-7-705 (effective Jan. 1, 2013). 
 135. See, e.g., Taylor v. Burlington Northern R.R. Co., 787 F.2d 1309, 1317 (9th Cir. 1986). 
 136. See, e.g., Toucet v. Mar. Overseas Corp., 991 F.2d 5, 10 (1st Cir. 1993). 
 137. See Simpkins v. State, 256 S.E.2d 63, 65 (Ga. Ct. App. 1979) (“[I]t is an evidentiary anomaly 
that—in proving general moral character, the law prefers hearsay, rumor, and gossip, to personal 
knowledge of the witness.”). 
 138. The credibility of a witness may be attacked or supported by evidence in the form of opinion or 
reputation, subject to the following limitations: 
   (1)The evidence may refer only to character for truthfulness or untruthfulness; and 
 (2)Evidence of truthful character shall be admissible only after the character of the witness 
for truthfulness has been attacked by opinion or reputation evidence or otherwise. 
GA. CODE ANN. § 24-6-608(a) (effective Jan. 1, 2013). 
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The current Georgia statute on using a character witness to 
impeach another witness139 is an unhappy combination of the pre-
2005 Georgia statute and Federal Rule 608.140 Part of the rule states 
that the witness “may refer only to character for truthfulness or 
untruthfulness” of the subject.141 Another part of the same statute 
states that the witness should be asked about the “general character” 
of the subject.142 The new rule is based solely on Federal Rule 608, 
and the character witness is limited to testifying regarding the 
subject’s character for truthfulness.143 
There is no change to the current rule144 that a character witness 
may not testify on direct to specific instances of the subject’s conduct 
that illustrate the subject’s character for truthfulness. However, in the 
discretion of the court, a character witness may be asked on cross-
examination if he has heard or knows of specific instances of conduct 
that rebut the character witness’s reputation or opinion testimony on 
direct.145 
Current Georgia rules never allow a cross-examiner to question a 
witness about past acts of untruthfulness, unrelated to the case, to 
impeach that witness’s credibility.146 The new rule gives the court 
discretion to allow such questions.147 
(21)  Impeachment by Prior Inconsistent Statement—The new rule 
relaxes the foundation requirements somewhat. When impeaching a 
witness with a prior oral inconsistent statement, the new rule does not 
require that counsel draw the witness’s attention to “the time, place, 
                                                                                                                 
 139. GA. CODE ANN. § 24-9-84 (2010). 
 140. See MILICH, supra note 5, § 14.5; see also FED. R. EVID. 608. 
 141. GA. CODE ANN. § 24-9-84(1) (2010). 
 142. Id. § 24-9-84(4). 
 143. Id. § 24-6-608(a) (effective Jan. 1, 2013). 
 144. Id. § 24-9-84(4). 
 145. GA. CODE ANN. § 24-6-608(b)(2) (effective Jan. 1, 2013). 
 146. See, e.g., Pruitt v. State, 514 S.E.2d 639, 649 (Ga. 1999). 
 147. GA. CODE ANN. § 24-6-608(b)(1) (effective Jan. 1, 2013); see, e.g., United States v. Matthews, 
168 F.3d 1234,1244 (11th Cir. 1999) (“Rule 608(b) provides that the trial court may in its discretion 
permit questioning about a witness’ prior bad acts on cross-examination, if the acts bear on the witness’ 
character for truthfulness. If the witness denies the conduct, such acts may not be proved by extrinsic 
evidence and the questioning party must take the witness’ answer, unless the evidence would be 
otherwise admissible as bearing on a material issue of the case.” (citations omitted)). 
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person, and circumstances attending the former statement.”148 Nor 
must counsel show the witness a prior written inconsistent statement 
before asking if the witness made the prior statement.149 The new rule 
still requires, however, that the witness be given an opportunity to 
explain or deny the prior inconsistent statement before any extrinsic 
evidence of the statement is offered into evidence.150 
In a departure from the Federal Rules, Georgia’s new rules retain 
the holding in Gibbons v. State that a prior inconsistent statement of a 
witness is admissible both to impeach the witness and, if the witness 
is available for cross-examination, as substantive evidence.151 
(22) Sequestration of Witnesses—Georgia’s current statute152 
technically only prohibits witnesses from the same side sitting in the 
courtroom together, though Georgia courts typically expand the order 
to prohibit witnesses from one side remaining in the courtroom while 
opposing witnesses testify.153 The new rule orders “witnesses 
excluded so that they cannot hear the testimony of other 
witnesses.”154 
Current Georgia practice discourages, but does not always 
prohibit, sequestering a party in a civil case.155 The new rule 
prohibits sequestration of a party,156 but the trial court still has 
                                                                                                                 
 148. GA. CODE ANN. § 24-9-83 (2010). Compare id., with GA. CODE ANN. § 24-6-613 (effective Jan. 
1, 2013). New Georgia Code section 24-6-613 provides: 
(a) In examining a witness concerning a prior statement made by the witness, whether written or 
not, the statement need not be shown nor its contents disclosed to the witness at that time; 
provided, however, upon request the same shall be shown or disclosed to opposing counsel. 
(b) Except as provided in Code Section 24-8-806, extrinsic evidence of a prior inconsistent 
statement by a witness shall not be admissible unless the witness is first afforded an opportunity 
to explain or deny the prior inconsistent statement and the opposite party is afforded an 
opportunity to interrogate the witness on the prior inconsistent statement or the interests of 
justice otherwise require. This subsection shall not apply to admissions of a party-opponent as 
set forth in paragraph (2) of subsection (d) of Code Section 24-8-801. 
GA. CODE ANN. § 24-6-613 (effective Jan. 1, 2013). 
 149. GA. CODE ANN. § 24-6-613 (effective Jan. 1, 2013). 
 150. Id. § 24-6-613(b). 
 151. Gibbons v. State, 286 S.E.2d 717, 721 (Ga. 1982). 
 152. GA. CODE ANN. § 24-9-61 (2010). 
 153. See, e.g., Gray v. State, 476 S.E.2d 12, 16 (Ga. Ct. App. 1996). 
 154. GA. CODE ANN. § 24-6-615 (effective Jan. 1, 2013). 
 155. See, e.g., Barber v. Barber, 360 S.E.2d 574, 575 (Ga. 1987). 
 156. This Code section shall not authorize exclusion of: 
   (1) A party who is a natural person; 
 (2) An officer or employee of a party which is not a natural person designated as its 
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discretion under new Georgia Code Section 24-6-611(a) to require 
that a party testify before other witnesses.157 
(23) Jurors May Not Testify in Cases on Which They Serve—
Believe it or not, current Georgia statutes still permit jurors to testify 
in a case on which they sit,158 though the practice has been judicially 
repudiated.159 The new rules strictly forbid a juror from testifying.160 
(B)  Rules Relating to Criminal Trials 
(24) Evidence of the Accused’s Good Character—The accused in 
a criminal case has the option of presenting evidence of his good 
character. Under current Georgia rules, the accused usually is limited 
to presenting evidence of his general good character,161 though some 
cases have permitted evidence of specific character traits.162 The new 
rules clarify that the accused may present evidence of any “pertinent 
trait of character,” general or specific.163 For example, although such 
general character traits as “law abiding” are always pertinent in a 
criminal case, evidence that the accused has a peaceful disposition 
would not be pertinent when the accused is charged only with theft. 
Likewise, the prosecution’s rebuttal is limited to the particular 
character traits presented by the accused.164 If the accused presents 
evidence of his reputation for being law abiding, the door is opened 
                                                                                                                 
representative by its attorney; or 
 (3) A person whose presence is shown by a party to be essential to the presentation of the 
party’s cause. 
GA. CODE ANN. § 24-6-615 (effective Jan. 1, 2013). 
 157. The court shall exercise reasonable control over the mode and order of interrogating witnesses 
and presenting evidence so as to: 
   (1) Make the interrogation and presentation effective for the ascertainment of the truth; 
   (2) Avoid needless consumption of time; and 
   (3) Protect witnesses from harassment or undue embarrassment. 
Id. § 24-6-611(a). 
 158. GA. CODE ANN. §§ 9-10-6, 17-9-20 (2010); see Tumlin v. State, 77 S.E.2d 555, 556 (Ga. Ct. 
App. 1953). 
 159. See, e.g., Lively v. State, 421 S.E.2d 528, 529 (Ga. 1992). 
 160. GA. CODE ANN. § 24-6-606(a) (effective Jan. 1, 2013). 
 161. See, e.g., Brooks v. State, 512 S.E.2d 693, 694 (Ga. Ct. App. 1999). 
 162. See, e.g., Walker v. State, 449 S.E.2d 845, 847 (Ga. Ct. App. 1994). 
 163. GA. CODE ANN. § 24-4-404(a)(1) (effective Jan. 1, 2013). 
 164. Id. 
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wide for rebuttal.165 But if the accused limits his character evidence 
to the trait of honesty, the prosecution can respond only with 
evidence rebutting that specific character trait.166 The new rule does 
not change existing Georgia law concerning instructing the jury 
regarding evidence of the accused’s good character in a criminal 
case.167 
The new rules clarify that if an accused testifies, he may present, 
during his direct examination, specific instances of his conduct that 
evidence a pertinent character trait.168 This retains current Georgia 
practice.169 
There is no change to the rule that, regardless of whether the 
accused presents evidence of his good character, if the defendant 
testifies to certain material facts on direct, the prosecution may offer 
evidence in rebuttal of those facts, even if the rebuttal reflects poorly 
on the accused’s character.170 
(25) Character Witnesses Concerning the Accused’s Character: 
Reputation and Opinion Evidence—Current Georgia law limits a 
character witness to the reputation of the subject and does not allow 
opinion testimony.171 Georgia courts have criticized this limitation.172 
The new rules expressly allow a qualified witness to express an 
opinion concerning the defendant’s character.173 
There is no change to the current rule that a character witness may 
not testify on direct to specific instances of the subject’s conduct that 
illustrate the subject’s character,174 but a character witness may be 
                                                                                                                 
 165. See id. 
 166. See id. 
 167. See Kurtz v. State, 652 S.E.2d 858, 861 (Ga. Ct. App. 2007). 
 168. GA. CODE ANN. § 24-4-405(b) (effective Jan. 1, 2013). 
 169. See, e.g., Harris v. State, 615 S.E.2d 532, 536 (Ga. 2005). 
 170. GA. CODE ANN. § 24-6-621 (effective Jan. 1, 2013) (“A witness may be impeached by 
disproving the facts testified to by the witness.”); Jones v. State, 363 S.E.2d 529, 534 (Ga. 1988). 
Current Georgia Code section 24-9-82 was retained and renumbered as new Georgia Code section 24-6-
621. 
 171. See Simpkins v. State, 256 S.E.2d 63, 65 (Ga. Ct. App. 1979). 
 172. See id. (“[I]t is an evidentiary anomaly that in proving general moral character, the law prefers 
hearsay, rumor, and gossip to personal knowledge of the witness.”). 
 173. In all proceedings in which evidence of character or a trait of character of a person is admissible, 
proof shall be made by testimony as to reputation or by testimony in the form of an opinion. 
GA. CODE ANN. § 24-4-405(a) (effective Jan. 1, 2013) 
 174. See, e.g., Thomas v. State, 655 S.E.2d 599, 601 (Ga. Ct. App. 2008). 
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asked on cross-examination if she has heard or knows of specific 
instances of conduct that rebut the character witness’s direct 
testimony.175 
(26) “Similar Transaction Rule” Renovated—Every American 
jurisdiction permits prosecution evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or 
acts of the accused that are not offered merely to prove the accused’s 
bad character or propensity to crime,176 but instead are specifically 
relevant to an issue in the case. Georgia’s version of this rule, 
misleadingly labeled the “similar transaction” rule,177 has gone 
further than most in admitting the accused’s prior crimes or acts to 
prove his criminal propensity.178 Georgia is the only jurisdiction that 
admits evidence of the accused’s unrelated past crimes and other bad 
acts to prove his “bent of mind” or “course of conduct.”179 Georgia 
cases do not explain where bent of mind came from or how it 
comports with the statutory rule against character evidence.180 Oddly, 
the only substantive discussion of bent of mind in Georgia cases is 
critical.181 
                                                                                                                 
 175. On cross-examination, inquiry shall be allowable into relevant specific instances of conduct. 
GA. CODE ANN.§ 24-4-405(c) (effective Jan. 1, 2013). 
 176. See Smith v. State, 501 S.E.2d 523, 525 (Ga. Ct. App. 1998) (“The primary aim of [the 
character] rule is to avoid the forbidden inference of propensity. Just because a defendant has committed 
wrongful acts in the past is not alone legal grounds to believe he has done so on the occasion under 
scrutiny.”). 
 177. See Barrett v. State, 436 S.E.2d 480, 481 n.2 (Ga. 1993); Young v. State, 642 S.E.2d 806, 808 
(Ga. Ct. App. 2007). 
 178. See MILICH, supra note 5, §§ 11.10, 11.13. 
 179. See Wade v. State, 670 S.E.2d 864, 867 (Ga. Ct. App. 2008); MILICH, supra note 5, § 11.13. 
 180. The general character of the parties and especially their conduct in other transactions are 
irrelevant matter unless the nature of the action involves such character and renders necessary or 
proper the investigation of such conduct. 
GA. CODE ANN. § 24-2-2 (effective Jan. 1, 2013); see Nicholson v. State, 186 S.E.2d 287, 289 (Ga. Ct. 
App. 1971) (“This is the very purpose of the general rule—to prevent a conviction for a particular crime 
based upon a showing of a criminal ‘bent of mind’.”); Shinall v. State, 147 S.E.2d 510, 511 (Ga. Ct. 
App. 1966) (“That evidence of other crimes offers an inference of a criminal bent of mind which makes 
it easier to believe the defendant has committed the crime for which he is on trial is exactly the reason 
for excluding such testimony.”); Story v. State, 98 S.E.2d 42, 45 (Ga. Ct. App. 1957) (“To permit the 
introduction of such evidence . . . merely to show ‘bent of mind’; that is to say, to permit the 
introduction of such evidence to show that the defendant is more likely to commit again a crime of 
which he has previously been guilty is the precise reason for excluding such testimony.”). 
 181. See, e.g., Farley v. State, 458 S.E.2d 643, 650 (1995) (Sears, J., concurring) (“First, ‘bent of 
mind’ and ‘course of conduct’ have evolved into amorphous catch-phrases, difficult to define and 
slippery in application. While they may be legitimate purposes for introducing independent crime 
evidence under some circumstances, careful analysis of the relevance of the evidence is especially 
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The new rules “reboot” the law in this area by adopting Federal 
Rule 404(b), which follows the traditional common law approach of 
admitting evidence of the accused’s other crimes, wrongs, or acts 
when specifically relevant to the necessary proof of “motive, 
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence 
of mistake or accident.”182 Terms like bent of mind and course of 
conduct, which essentially invite admitting the accused’s past crimes 
to prove his criminal character, are gone and hopefully forgotten. 
The new rules retain the current requirement that the prosecution 
provide pretrial notice of its intent to offer “other crimes, wrongs, or 
acts” evidence.183 Also retained is the rule dispensing with such 
notice when the other crimes, wrongs, or acts evidence is offered to 
prove the circumstances surrounding the charged offense, motive, or 
prior difficulties between the accused and the victim, when 
relevant.184 
The similar transaction rule in Georgia “has been most liberally 
extended in cases involving sexual offenses.”185 The new rules 
continue this policy with the adoption of Federal Rules 413, 414, and 
415.186 
In DUI cases, the routine use of the bent of mind slogan has 
resulted in the nearly automatic admission of the driver defendant’s 
                                                                                                                 
important when those purposes are claimed. Such careful scrutiny is essential because a person’s bent of 
mind is dangerously close to being his character, and a person’s course of conduct could easily show 
nothing more than a mere propensity to act in a certain manner.”); Payne v. State, 674 S.E.2d 298 
(2009) (Hunstein, J., dissenting) (“[u]sing phrases like ‘bent of mind’ or ‘course of conduct’ totally 
obscures the distinction between legitimate evidence and the prohibited evidence of character”) (quoting 
Paul S. Milich, Georgia Rules of Evidence, § 11.13, p. 189-190 (2d. ed. 2002)). 
 182. Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts shall not be admissible to prove the character of a 
person in order to show action in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other 
purposes, including, but not limited to, proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, 
knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident. The prosecution in a criminal proceeding 
shall provide reasonable notice to the defense in advance of trial, unless pretrial notice is excused 
by the court upon good cause shown, of the general nature of any such evidence it intends to 
introduce at trial. Notice shall not be required when the evidence of prior crimes, wrongs, or acts 
is offered to prove the circumstances immediately surrounding the charged crime, motive, or 
prior difficulties between the accused and the alleged victim. 
GA. CODE ANN. § 24-4-404(b) (effective Jan. 1, 2013). 
 183. Id.; see also GA. UNIF. SUP. CT. R. 31.3. 
 184. See GA. CODE ANN. § 24-4-404(b) (effective Jan. 1, 2013); MILICH, supra note 5, § 11.11. 
 185. Kingsley v. State, 603 S.E.2d 78, 79 (Ga. Ct. App. 2004). 
 186. GA. CODE ANN. §§ 24-4-413 to -415 (effective Jan. 1, 2013). 
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prior DUI offenses,187 despite the fact that the driver’s intent is not an 
issue in DUI prosecutions.188 With the loss of the bent of mind 
exception upon the adoption of new rules of evidence, prosecutors 
were concerned that a defendant’s prior DUIs would be inadmissible 
regardless of their specific relevance to an issue in the case.189 New 
Georgia Code Section 24-4-417 was added to describe two situations 
in which a DUI defendant’s prior DUI would be admissible, as well 
as to confirm that a court could admit a prior DUI under section 24-
4-404(b) if it meets the requirements of that section.190 
(27) Factual Bases of an Expert’s Opinion in Criminal Trials—
The 2005 tort reform package included a provision adopting versions 
of Federal Rules 702 (the Daubert rule) and 703 (bases of expert 
testimony).191 Prosecutors opposed any adoption of Daubert in 
criminal cases and lawmakers responded by limiting both of 
Georgia’s versions of 702 and 703 to civil cases.192 This probably 
was inadvertent since 703 has nothing to do with 702 or Daubert. 
The two provisions just happened to be in the same proposed code 
                                                                                                                 
 187. See, e.g., Lowenthal v. State, 593 S.E.2d 726, 729 (Ga. Ct. App. 2004); Fields v. State, 512 
S.E.2d 19, 23 (Ga. Ct. App. 1999). 
 188. See, e.g., Prine v. State, 515 S.E.2d 425, 427 (Ga. Ct. App. 1999). 
 189. Daniel Hendrix et al., Note, Evidence, 27 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 1, 8 (2010). 
 190. (a) In a criminal proceeding involving a prosecution for a violation of Code Section 40-6-391, 
evidence of the commission of another violation of Code Section 40-6-391 on a different 
occasion by the same accused shall be admissible when: 
 (1) The accused refused in the current case to take the state administered test required by 
Code Section 40-5-55 and such evidence is relevant to prove knowledge, plan, or absence of 
mistake or accident; 
 (2) The accused refused in the current case to provide an adequate breath sample for the state 
administered test required by Code Section 40-5-55 and such evidence is relevant to prove 
knowledge, plan, or absence of mistake or accident; or 
 (3) The identity of the driver is in dispute in the current case and such evidence is relevant to 
prove identity. 
(b) In a criminal proceeding in which the state intends to offer evidence under this Code section, 
the prosecuting attorney shall disclose such evidence to the accused, including statements of 
witnesses or a summary of the substance of any testimony that the prosecuting attorney expects 
to offer, at least ten days in advance of trial, unless the time is shortened or pretrial notice is 
excused by the judge upon good cause shown. 
(c) This Code section shall not be the exclusive means to admit or consider evidence described in 
this Code section. 
GA. CODE ANN. § 24-4-417 (effective Jan. 1, 2013). 
 191. SB 3 (SCS), 2005 Ga. Gen. Assem. 
 192. MILICH, supra note 5, § 15.5, at 435 n.1. 
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section.193 The new rules apply Georgia’s version of Federal Rule 
703 to criminal, as well as civil, trials.194 
The current rules in criminal cases regarding the permissible 
factual bases of an expert witness’s opinion are inconsistent and 
confusing. Although it is often stated that an expert may rely on some 
hearsay in forming her opinion, it is far from clear what quantitative 
or qualitative limitations there are on such hearsay and, more 
importantly, whether the expert may disclose the otherwise 
inadmissible hearsay upon which she relied to the jury.195 
Under the new rules, an expert witness may base her opinion on 
inadmissible evidence, including hearsay, if the facts are “of a type 
reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming 
opinions or inferences upon the subject.”196 In a jury trial, the 
otherwise inadmissible facts upon which the expert relied “shall not 
be disclosed to the jury by the proponent of the opinion or inference 
unless the court determines that their probative value in assisting the 
jury to evaluate the expert’s opinion substantially outweighs their 
prejudicial effect.”197 Opposing counsel may inquire into any and all 
factual bases of an expert’s opinion.198 
There is no change in the basic rule that an expert may not be a 
mere conduit for the opinions of other experts not before the court.199 
Although an expert may base her opinion, in part, on what she 
learned from other experts, the testifying expert must have, and be 
able to defend, her own opinion, arrived at independently.200 
(28) Admissions by Silence in Criminal Cases—At one time, 
Georgia cases liberally admitted anything said in the presence of a 
party, including when the party was a criminal suspect and was silent 
                                                                                                                 
 193. See GA. CODE ANN. § 24-9-67.1(a)–(b) (effective Jan. 1, 2013). New Code Section 24-9-67.1(a) 
corresponds to Federal Rule 702 and new Code Section 24-9-67.1(b) corresponds to Federal Rule 703. 
 194. GA. CODE. ANN. § 24-7-703 (effective Jan. 1, 2013). 
 195. See MILICH, supra note 5, § 15.5. 
 196. GA. CODE ANN. § 24-7-703 (effective Jan. 1, 2013). 
 197. Id. 
 198. Id. § 24-7-705. 
 199. See, e.g., United States v. Grey Bear, 883 F.2d 1382, 1392–93 (8th Cir. 1989); Horton v. 
Hendrix, 662 S.E.2d 227, 234 (Ga. Ct. App. 2008). 
 200. See, e.g., United States v. Floyd, 281 F.3d 1346, 1349 (11th Cir. 2002); Watkins v. State, 676 
S.E.2d 196, 200 (Ga. 2009). 
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in the presence of the police.201 The Georgia Supreme Court 
repudiated this rule in Jarrett v. State,202 and broadly held that “a 
witness in a criminal trial may not testify as to a declarant’s 
statements based on the acquiescence or silence of the accused.”203 
This decision excludes tacit admissions by the accused’s silence even 
when there are no police present and the accused was not exercising a 
right to remain silent.204 This goes further than most applications of 
the Federal Rule,205 which admit a defendant’s silence, not made in 
the presence of the police, when “under the circumstances, an 
innocent defendant would normally be induced to respond, and 
[when] . . . there are sufficient foundational facts from which the jury 
could infer that the defendant heard, understood, and acquiesced in 
the statement.”206 
Georgia’s rule was based on a balancing of probative value against 
unfair prejudice under Georgia’s current tacit admission statute.207 
Whether Georgia courts will construe new Code Section 24-8-
801(d)(2)(B)208 the same way as the old Georgia statute or the way 
federal courts construe it remains to be seen. 
(29) Co-Conspirator Exception Clarified—Georgia’s current 
hearsay exception for co-conspirator’s statements comes from the 
Code of 1863.209 For well over a half century, this statute was 
construed to conform to the common law rule that only statements 
made by a conspirator in furtherance of the conspiracy were 
                                                                                                                 
 201. See, e.g., Jarrett v. State, 441 S.E.2d 843 (Ga. Ct. App. 1994), aff’d on other grounds, 453 S.E.2d 
461, 463 (Ga. 1995). 
 202. Jarrett, 453 S.E.2d at 463. 
 203. Id. 
 204. See Reynolds v. State, 673 S.E.2d 854, 855 (Ga. 2009). 
 205. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(B). 
 206. United States v. Carter, 760 F.2d 1568, 1579 (11th Cir. 1985). 
 207. Acquiescence or silence, when the circumstances require an answer, a denial, or other conduct, 
may amount to an admission. 
GA. CODE ANN. § 24-3-36 (effective Jan. 1, 2013); see Reynolds v. State, 673 S.E.2d 854, 855 (Ga. 
2009); Mallory v. State, 409 S.E.2d 839, 843 (Ga. 1991). 
 208. New Code Section 801(d)(2)(B) defines a tacit admission simply as: “A statement of which the 
party has manifested an adoption or belief in its truth.” GA. CODE ANN. § 24-8-801(d)(2)(B) (effective 
Jan. 1, 2013). 
 209. After the fact of conspiracy is proved, the declarations by any one of the conspirators during the 
pendency of the criminal project shall be admissible against all. 
GA. CODE ANN. § 24-3-5 (2010). 
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admissible.210 No Georgia cases have expressly dropped the “in 
furtherance” requirement, and it still appears in a few cases211 and in 
the pattern jury instruction approved by the Georgia Council of 
Superior Court Judges.212 Yet there are dozens of reported cases in 
which a co-conspirator’s statements were admitted even though there 
was no possible sense in which they were in the furtherance of any 
conspiracy; indeed, in many of the cases the statements were adverse 
to the interests of the conspiracy.213 Yet these cases include no 
discussion of that fact, leading to the impression that the in 
furtherance requirement for co-conspirator’s statements is forgotten, 
if not gone. 
The new rule is based on Federal Rule 801(d)(2)(E) and expressly 
includes the in furtherance requirement.214 This restores Georgia’s 
co-conspirator exception to its original common law form.215 The 
new rule adds two sentences to the language of the Federal Rule. The 
first clarifies that if the conspirators, after the commission of the 
crime, continue to conspire to conceal the crime and the statement is 
in furtherance of that conspiracy to conceal, the statement is 
admissible under the exception.216 The second clarifies that the 
exception is available regardless of whether the accused was charged 
with conspiracy.217 
Under current Georgia law, the jury ultimately decides whether the 
foundation for a co-conspirator statement has been met and is 
instructed accordingly.218 The offered statement may not be 
                                                                                                                 
 210. See MILICH, supra note 5, § 18.11. 
 211. See, e.g., Castillo v. State, 642 S.E.2d 8, 12 (Ga. 2007). 
 212. 2 COUNCIL OF SUPERIOR COURT JUDGES OF GA., SUGGESTED PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS § 
2.02.40 (3d ed. 2003) [hereinafter PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS]. 
 213. See MILICH, supra note 5, § 18.11 at n. 33 (citing cases). 
 214. A statement by a coconspirator of a party during the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy, 
including a statement made during the concealment phase of a conspiracy. A conspiracy need not 
be charged in order to make a statement admissible under this subparagraph. 
GA. CODE ANN. § 24-8-801(d)(2)(E) (effective Jan. 1, 2013). 
 215. See MILICH, supra note 5, § 18.11. 
 216. This is consistent with federal cases. See, United States v. Carter, 721 F.2d 1514, 1524–25 (11th 
Cir. 1984). 
 217. This is also consistent with federal cases. See United States v. Maldanado-Rivera, 922 F.2d 934, 
962 (2d Cir. 1990). 
 218. See, e.g., Roberson v. State, 493 S.E.2d 697, 704 (1997); see also PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS, 
supra note 212, § 2.02.40. 
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considered in making this determination.219 Under the new rules, the 
judge alone decides whether, by a preponderance of the evidence, the 
foundation exists,220 and the offered statement can be considered, 
along with other evidence, in making this determination.221 However, 
the offered statement alone is not sufficient to establish the basis for 
its admissibility but must be supported by independent evidence.222 
(30) Statement Against Interest Hearsay Exception Liberalized—
The current Georgia rule limits the statements against interest 
exception to when the declarant is dead.223 The new rule only 
requires that the declarant be unavailable as a witness at trial.224 
Current Georgia law does not admit statements against penal interest 
when offered by the defendant in a criminal case225 and allows the 
prosecution to offer such statements only when the declarant is dead 
and the statement was not made with a view to pending legal 
proceedings.226 
The new rule admits statements against penal interest in criminal 
cases on equal terms for the prosecution and the defense. As a 
condition to using the exception, the proponent (whether the 
prosecutor or defense counsel) must show that the statement is 
“[s]upported by corroborating circumstances that clearly indicate the 
trustworthiness of the statement.”227 
(31) Forfeiture Hearsay Exception—The new rules provide a 
hearsay exception for statements made by a person who is 
“unavailable” to testify at trial and the “statement [is] offered against 
a party that has engaged or acquiesced in wrongdoing that was 
intended to, and did, procure the unavailability of the declarant as a 
witness.”228 Thus, for example, in a domestic violence case where the 
                                                                                                                 
 219. See PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 212. 
 220. GA. CODE ANN. § 24-1-104(a) (effective Jan. 1, 2013). 
 221. Id. § 24-8-801(d)(2). 
 222. Id. 
 223. GA. CODE ANN. § 24-3-8 (2010). 
 224. GA. CODE ANN. § 24-8-804 (effective Jan. 1, 2013). 
 225. See, e.g., Timberlake v. State, 271 S.E.2d 792, 796 (Ga. 1980). 
 226. Crowder v. State, 227 S.E.2d 230, 239 (Ga. 1976); see MILICH, supra note 5, § 19.29. 
 227. GA. CODE ANN. § 24-8-804(b)(3)(B) (effective Jan. 1, 2013). 
 228. Id. § 24-8-804(b)(5). A very early Georgia case recognized the common law exception for 
forfeiture, but it has not appeared again in Georgia cases for over 150 years. See Williams v. State, 19 
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spouse-victim asserts a privilege not to testify and thus becomes 
unavailable as a witness at trial, if the prosecution can convince the 
trial judge, by a preponderance of the evidence,229 that the defendant 
used wrongful means to get the spouse to invoke the privilege, the 
court could admit the spouse’s out-of-court statements over a hearsay 
objection.230 
(32) Application of Rules to Probation Revocation Hearings—
Currently, the exact extent to which the rules of evidence apply to 
probation revocation hearings is a bit fuzzy. Currently, hearsay is 
inadmissible at a probation revocation hearing,231 and the probationer 
is entitled to due process232 and “fundamental fairness.”233 The stakes 
at a probation revocation hearing are high enough that the rules of 
evidence ought to be clear and consistent from court to court and not 
left to the vagueness of generalized fairness requirements. 
The new rules expressly state that the rules of evidence apply to 
probation revocation hearings.234 There is no change to the standard 
of proof at such hearings, which is preponderance of the evidence.235 
Nor is there any change to parole revocation hearings, which are 
administrative matters handled by the Board of Pardons and Parole. 
The rules of evidence traditionally have not been applied in such 
proceedings.236 
(C) Rules Relating to Civil Trials 
(33) Subsequent Remedial Measure Rule in Product Liability 
Cases—Courts and scholars have debated whether the subsequent 
                                                                                                                 
Ga. 402, 403 (1856). 
 229. GA. CODE ANN. § 24-1-104(a) (effective Jan. 1, 2013). 
 230. The court could also admit the statements over a Confrontation Clause objection since forfeiture 
applies to that Sixth Amendment right as well. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 61 (2004); see 
also Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 833 (2006). 
 231. See, e.g., Brown v. State, 668 S.E.2d 490, 493 (Ga. Ct. App. 2008). 
 232. See Black v. Romano, 471 U.S. 606, 611 (1985). 
 233. Meadows v. Settles, 561 S.E.2d 105, 108–09 (Ga. 2002). 
 234. GA. CODE ANN. § 24-1-2(b) (effective Jan. 1, 2013). 
 235. GA. CODE ANN. § 42-8-34.1(b) (2010). 
 236. Williams v. Lawrence, 540 S.E.2d 599, 601–02 (Ga. 2001); see GA. CODE ANN. § 24-1-2(c)(4) 
(effective Jan. 1, 2013) (stating the rules of evidence do not apply to “[p]roceedings for revoking 
parole”). 
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remedial measure rule should apply in product liability cases. In 
1997, Federal Rule 407 was amended to clarify that, at least in 
federal courts, subsequent remedial measures would not be admitted 
in product liability cases.237 Georgia courts, on the other hand, sided 
with the view that it is not necessary to exclude evidence of 
subsequent remedial measures in product liability cases because 
product manufacturers have a host of other incentives to remedy 
defects in their products, regardless of whether such efforts might be 
used against them in a lawsuit.238 The new rules retain Georgia policy 
in this respect and thus depart from the current Federal Rule.239 
Georgia’s version of Federal Rule 407 also clarifies that the rule 
excludes remedial measures that follow an injury or harm but without 
the apparent limitation in the Federal Rule that the remedial measure 
must have followed the injury or harm to the plaintiff in the subject 
lawsuit.240 
(34) Compromise Negotiations and Offers of Settlement—
Although current Georgia law excludes statements made “with a 
view to a compromise,”241 the protections afforded by the rule are not 
always as reassuring as participants in settlement negotiations would 
like. Vague distinctions between offers “to compromise” and offers 
“to settle,”242 questions about whether the protection extends to 
negotiations over damages where liability is admitted,243 and doubts 
about coverage of statements that are collateral to actual offers to 
                                                                                                                 
 237. FED. R. EVID. 407. 
 238. John Crane, Inc. v. Jones, 586 S.E.2d 26, 31 (Ga. Ct. App. 2003), aff’d, 604 S.E.2d 822 (Ga. 
2004); General Motors Corp. v. Moseley, 447 S.E.2d 302, 310 (Ga. Ct. App. 1994). 
 239. In civil proceedings, when, after an injury or harm, remedial measures are taken to make such 
injury or harm less likely to recur, evidence of the remedial measures shall not be admissible to 
prove negligence or culpable conduct but may be admissible to prove product liability under 
subsection (b) or (c) of Code Section 51-1-11. The provisions of this Code section shall not 
require the exclusion of evidence of remedial measures when offered for impeachment or for 
another purpose, including, but not limited to, proving ownership, control, or feasibility of 
precautionary measures, if controverted. 
GA. CODE ANN. § 24-4-407 (effective Jan. 1, 2013). 
 240. Id. 
 241. GA. CODE ANN. § 24-3-37 (2010). 
 242. See, e.g., Teasley v. Bradley, 35 S.E. 782, 787 (Ga. 1900); Stover v. Candle Corp. of Am., 520 
S.E.2d 7, 8 (Ga. Ct. App. 1999). 
 243. See Pac. Nat’l Fire Ins. Co. v. Beavers, 73 S.E.2d 765, 768–69 (Ga. Ct. App. 1952). 
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compromise244 all contribute to a less-than-certain environment for 
discussing settlement. The new rule provides broader and more 
definitive protection for such discussions. As long as the parties are 
engaged in compromise negotiations or mediation, all of their 
statements and conduct, as well as the statements of nonparties who 
participate in the discussions, are protected from disclosure.245 
(35) Payment of Medical and Similar Expenses—At one time in 
Georgia, a party’s offer to pay medical or similar expenses was 
considered an offer to settle, not an offer to compromise, and thus 
was admissible.246 Later Georgia cases softened this rule to provide 
that if the trial judge determined that the offer to pay expenses was 
made on an impulse of benevolence or sympathy, it should not be 
considered an admission of liability.247 The new rule ends any 
uncertainties or caveats in this area: “Evidence of furnishing, 
offering, or promising to pay medical, hospital, or similar expenses 
occasioned by an injury shall not be admissible to prove liability for 
the injury.”248 
(36) Agent Admission Rule Liberalized—Current Georgia law on 
vicarious admissions by agents is burdened by the presence of two 
overlapping statutes, one from Title 24 (the Evidence Code)249 and 
the other from Title 10 (the Commerce and Trade Code).250 This has 
led to confusing and inconsistent applications of the rule.251 
Generally, an agent’s or employee’s statements are admissible under 
                                                                                                                 
 244. See, e.g., Nevitt v. CMD Realty Inv. Fund IV, L.P., 639 S.E.2d 336, 339–40 (Ga. Ct. App. 
2006); Bounds v. Coventry Green Homeowners’ Ass’n, 601 S.E.2d 440, 442–43 (Ga. Ct. App. 2004). 
 245. See, e.g., Blu-J, Inc. v. Kemper C.P.A. Grp., 916 F.2d 637, 642 (11th Cir. 1990). 
 246. Monson v. Brown, 292 S.E.2d 486, 486 (Ga. Ct. App. 1982). 
 247. See, e.g., Neubert v. Vigh, 462 S.E.2d 808, 809 (Ga. Ct. App. 1995); White v. Front Page, Inc., 
213 S.E.2d 32, 33 (Ga. Ct. App. 1975). 
 248. GA. CODE ANN. § 24-4-409 (effective Jan. 1, 2013). 
 249. Admissions by an agent or attorney-in-fact, during the existence and in pursuance of his agency, 
shall be admissible against the principal. 
GA. CODE ANN. § 24-3-33 (2010) 
 250. The agent shall be a competent witness either for or against his principal. His interest shall go to 
credit. The declarations of the agent as to the business transacted by him shall not be admissible 
against his principal unless they were part of the negotiation constituting the res gestae, or else 
the agent is dead. 
Id. §10-6-64. 
 251. See MILICH, supra note 5, § 18.10. 
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current Georgia law only if the agent or employee was authorized to 
speak on behalf of the principal.252 
The new rules clarify and broaden the scope of agency admissions 
in contrast to prior Georgia law. New Code Section 24-8-
801(d)(2)(D) sets forth two simple requirements for an agency or 
employee admission: First, the statement was made during the 
agency or employment relationship. Second, the subject matter of the 
statement concerns a matter the agent or employee would know about 
by virtue of his agent or employee duties.253 
The new rule does not purport to redefine substantive law 
regarding when a principal is legally bound by the actions or words 
of his agent but only defines an agency admission for purposes of 
clearing a hearsay objection. Thus, even though an employee may not 
have been authorized to make the statement in question, the court 
may admit it over a hearsay objection if it meets the requirements of 
this subsection.254 
Under current Georgia law, the jury ultimately decides whether the 
foundation for an agency admission is met and is instructed 
accordingly.255 The offered statement is not considered in making 
this determination.256 Under the new rules, the judge alone decides 
whether, by a preponderance of the evidence, the foundation 
exists,257 and the offered statement is considered along with other 
evidence in making this determination.258 However, the offered 
                                                                                                                 
 252. Id.; see, e.g., Taylor v. Golden Corral Corp., 567 S.E.2d 109, 111 (Ga. Ct. App. 2002); McDevitt 
& Street Co. v. K-C Air Conditioning Serv., Inc., 418 S.E.2d 87, 93–94 (Ga. Ct. App. 1992). 
 253. A statement by the party’s agent or employee, but not including any agent of the state in a 
criminal proceeding, concerning a matter within the scope of the agency or employment, made 
during the existence of the relationship. 
GA. CODE ANN. § 24-8-801(d)(2)(D) (effective Jan. 1, 2013). 
 254. See, e.g., Corley v. Burger King, 56 F.3d 709, 709 (5th Cir. 1995) (holding that although an 
employee was not authorized to speak for his employer, the subject matter of the employee’s statement 
as to what he was doing at time of a car accident fell within the scope of his employment and was an 
agent admission). 
 255. See, e.g., Ga. Power Co. v. Busbin, 283 S.E.2d 647, 650–51 (Ga. Ct. App. 1981). 
 256. McDevitt & Street Co. v. K-C Air Conditioning Serv., Inc., 418 S.E.2d 87, 93–94 (Ga. Ct. App. 
1992). 
 257. GA. CODE ANN. § 24-1-104(a) (effective Jan. 1, 2013). 
 258. Id. § 24-8-801(d)(2). 
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statement alone is not sufficient to establish the basis for its 
admissibility but must be supported by independent evidence.259 
The federal courts have overwhelmingly held that Federal Rule 
801(d)(2)(D) does not allow the accused in a criminal trial to offer 
the out–of–court statements of police officers or other agents of the 
State as agent admissions.260 Likewise, Georgia has never permitted 
such statements as admissions of the State. The new rule makes this 
explicit.261 
(37) Impeaching the Verdict in Civil Cases—Current Georgia law 
does not allow a juror to testify in court or by affidavit as to the 
internal discussions and deliberations of the jury after the jury has 
rendered its verdict and been excused.262 The new rules are to the 
same effect. However, the new rules include an exception for when 
“extraneous prejudicial information was improperly brought to the 
juror’s attention” or “any outside influence was brought to bear upon 
any juror.”263 This exception currently is recognized in criminal cases 
in Georgia,264 but for inexplicable reasons does not apply in civil 
cases.265 The new rule applies to all jury trials, civil or criminal.266 
(38) Evidence Rules Do Not Apply to Custody and Dispositional 
Hearings in Juvenile Courts—Most cases construe current Georgia 
Code Sections 15-11-56(a) and 15-11-65(b) to significantly relax the 
rules of evidence, including the hearsay rule, in custody and 
dispositional hearings in juvenile court,267 though a few cases have 
held otherwise.268 The new rules make it clear that the rules of 
                                                                                                                 
 259. Id. 
 260. See, e.g., United States v. Prevatte, 16 F.3d 767, 779 n.9 (7th Cir. 1994). 
 261. GA. CODE ANN. § 24-8-801(d)(2)(D) (effective Jan. 1, 2013). 
 262. GA. CODE ANN. §§ 9-10-9, 17-9-41 (2010). 
 263. GA. CODE ANN. § 24-6-606(b) (effective Jan. 1, 2013). 
 264. See, e.g., Spencer v. State, 398 S.E.2d 179, 184 (Ga. 1990). 
 265. See, e.g., Newson v. Foster, 581 S.E.2d 666, 668 (Ga. Ct. App. 2003). 
 266. GA. CODE ANN. § 24-6-606 (effective Jan. 1, 2013). 
 267. See, e.g., In re J.C., 251 S.E.2d 299, 302 (Ga. 1978); In re M.D., 503 S.E.2d 888, 889 (Ga. Ct. 
App.1988). 
 268. In re A.R., 673 S.E.2d 586, 588 (Ga. Ct. App. 2009); In re K.I.S., 669 S.E.2d 207, 209 (Ga. Ct. 
App. 2008). 
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evidence do not apply269 and thus, hearsay may be considered “to the 
extent of its probative value.”270 
IV.  UNFINISHED BUSINESS—A FEW ISSUES TO ADDRESS IN THE 
FUTURE 
Despite the considerable breadth of this year’s changes to the 
evidence rules in Georgia, a few issues remain unresolved and 
deserve some future attention. For example, the spousal witness 
privilege allows a spouse to refuse to testify in criminal proceedings 
involving the other spouse.271 There is an exception for cases in 
which a spouse is charged with a crime against a minor.272 Many 
states extend that exception to crimes against the spouse, such as 
spousal abuse.273 Proponents of extending the exception argue that 
the law should make it more difficult for a victim spouse to decline to 
testify against the defendant spouse.274 Opponents point out that if 
the victim spouse cannot claim the privilege, but nevertheless refuses 
to testify, the victim spouse faces a contempt of court charge, 
victimizing the victim a second time.275 It is not an easy issue. While 
there was debate in the State Bar Committee and legislature about the 
pros and cons of extending the exception, the consensus was that the 
issue deserved separate discussion and treatment, apart from the 
general reform of the evidence code.276 
The State Bar proposed updating Georgia’s current “clergy 
privilege,” which by its terms applies only to clergy and members of 
the Christian and Jewish faiths.277 The proposed changes got lost 
                                                                                                                 
 269. GA. CODE ANN. § 24-1-2(c)(7) (effective Jan. 1, 2013). 
 270. GA. CODE ANN. §§ 15-11-56(a), 15-11-65(b) (2010). 
 271. Id. § 24-9-23(a). 
 272. Id. § 24-9-23(b). 
 273. MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 64, § 84. 
 274. See e.g., Kenneth J. Lewis, Note, The Marital Crime Exception: Why Georgia’s Marital 
Privilege Law Should be Changed, 4 J. MARSHALL L.J. 235, 250–51 (2011). 
 275. R. Michael Cassidy, Reconsidering Spousal Privileges After Crawford, 33 AM. J. CRIM. L. 339, 
355 (2006). 
 276. See H.R. 840, 150th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2009), available at 
http://www1.legis.ga.gov/legis/2009_10/fulltext/hb840.htm. 
 277. Every communication made by any person professing religious faith, seeking spiritual comfort, 
or seeking counseling to any Protestant minister of the Gospel, any priest of the Roman Catholic 
41
Milich: Georgia's New Evidence Code - An Overview
Published by Reading Room, 2011
420 GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 28:2 
 
along the legislative path over debate on how to define “religions.” 
The current limitations on the privilege are constitutionally 
questionable.278 
Current Georgia law requires that certain professionals report 
evidence of child abuse, notwithstanding any evidentiary privileges 
that otherwise apply.279 What is unclear is whether the professionals 
covered by evidentiary privileges—such as psychologists, clinical 
social workers, therapists, etc.—are free not only to report the child 
abuse but also to testify in subsequent proceedings related to that 
report. At least one state with a statute like Georgia’s has held that 
allowing the disclosure of privileged information for reporting 
purposes does not abrogate the testimonial privilege.280 Florida has 
clarified its statute to allow the reporting professional to testify.281 
Georgia should decide how it wants to handle this issue and proceed 
accordingly. 
The State Bar proposed some changes to the rape victim shield 
rule, but the legislature decided to leave it alone.282 The effort to 
reform Georgia’s rape victim shield rule has become a victim of 
political demagoguery,283 which is a shame since there are 
                                                                                                                 
faith, any priest of the Greek Orthodox Catholic faith, any Jewish rabbi, or to any Christian or 
Jewish minister, by whatever name called, shall be deemed privileged. No such minister, priest, 
or rabbi shall disclose any communications made to him by any such person professing religious 
faith, seeking spiritual guidance, or seeking counseling, nor shall such minister, priest, or rabbi 
be competent or compellable to testify with reference to any such communication in any court. 
GA. CODE ANN. § 24-9-22 (2010). The State Bar proposal would have changed the statute to read: 
Every confidential communication made by any person professing religious faith, seeking 
spiritual guidance, reconciliation, or counseling to any minister, priest, rabbi, imam, or similar 
functionary of a bona fide religious organization, shall be deemed privileged and shall not be 
disclosed by the minister, priest, rabbi, imam, or similar functionary of such a bona fide religious 
organization. 
See supra note 8, at 52. 
 278. MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 64, § 76:2. 
 279. Suspected child abuse which is required to be reported by any person pursuant to this Code 
section shall be reported notwithstanding that the reasonable cause to believe such abuse has 
occurred or is occurring is based in whole or in part upon any communication to that person 
which is otherwise made privileged or confidential by law. 
GA. CODE ANN. § 19-7-5(g) (2010). 
 280. State v. Snell, 714 A.2d 977, 981 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1998). 
 281. FLA. STAT. § 39.204 (2010). 
 282. Hendrix et al., supra note 189, at 19. 
 283. See, e.g., Larry Peterson, Barnes, Deal Bash Each Other with Hard-Hitting Ads, 
SAVANNAHNOW.COM (Oct. 16, 2010, 3:19 AM), http://savannahnow.com/news/2010-10-16/barnes-
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inconsistencies in judicial construction of the statute that have little to 
do with policy but should be resolved simply as a matter of providing 
clarity and certainty in the application of the rule.284 Moreover, 
Georgia’s current rape victim shield act does not apply to several 
kinds of sexual assault cases.285 The proposed State Bar rule would 
have applied to all crimes involving sexual assault.286 
Finally, Georgia currently applies Daubert and its provisions for 
judicial review of the reliability of expert testimony in civil cases but 
not in criminal cases.287 On its face, this distinction is puzzling. 
Daubert was designed to improve the overall reliability of scientific 
and other expert testimony in the courtroom.288 It is unclear why a 
state would want that improved reliability only in civil, not criminal, 
cases. Particularly in light of recent major studies that raise serious 
concerns about the reliability of expert testimony in criminal cases,289 
the legislature should look at extending the judicial scrutiny that 
Daubert requires to criminal cases. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Adoption of new rules of evidence will bring two changes to 
Georgia practice. The first, the substantive changes in the law of 
evidence, are briefly summarized in this article. The second change is 
                                                                                                                 
deal-bash-each-other-hard-hitting-ads-0#.TnTRiuzAyso; Larry Peterson, Barnes, Deal Wrangle over 
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accessibility. Rules of evidence are only as good as the lawyers and 
judges who must recall and apply them quickly and accurately in the 
heat of trial. Compared with existing Georgia law, the new rules 
provide a clearer, simpler, more comprehensive approach to 
evidentiary issues. The new Code states: 
The object of all legal investigation is the discovery of truth. 
Rules of evidence shall be construed to secure fairness in 
administration, eliminate unjustifiable expense and delay, and 
promote the growth and development of the law of evidence to 
the end that the truth may be ascertained and proceedings justly 
determined.290 
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